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‚Ü‚½AArticlesAWorking Papers‚ɂ‚«‚Ü‚µ‚ẮAŠ¸‚¦‚Ä’p‚ðŽN‚µ‚āA‚²ˆÓŒ©‚𒸑Ղµ‚悤‚Æ‚¢‚¤ˆÓ}‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B

ƒz[ƒ€ƒy[ƒW‚ÉŒfÚ‚̃[ƒ‹ƒAƒhƒŒƒX‚܂ŁAƒRƒƒ“ƒg‚𒸂¯‚ê‚΍K‚¢‚Å‚·B

y‰ß‹Ž‚Ì z¦ˆê•”‚̃Šƒ“ƒNØ‚ê‚Í‚²—eŽÍ‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

yInstitutional Framework of EC and UK Competition Lawz

yConcepts of EU laws and related Jargonsz

yConcepts closely related to Competition Lawz

yCompeting Ideas-from OXERA free servicez

yArticlesz

yWorking Papersc‚ƌĂׂé“ú‚Í‚¢‚‚©Hz

yPreparatory Papersz - WHAT DO YOU THINK THIS IDEA?

 

y‰ß‹Ž‚Ì z¦ƒTƒCƒgˆÚ“®“™‚É”º‚¤ƒŠƒ“ƒNØ‚ꂪ‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B‚²—eŽÍ‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

2005-03-22

Ž‘—¿•ÛŠÇŒÉEŠÇ—l‚̂ЂƂ育‚ƁF‚±‚ê‚Ü‚Å‚ÌŽG‹L‚ðAƒuƒƒO‚Ɉڍs‚µ‚Ä‚Ý‚Ü‚µ‚½i’x‚߂̐V‚µ‚à‚̍D‚«HEÎjB’¦‚è‚Ä‚·‚®Œ³‚É–ß‚·‚©‚à‚µ‚ê‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ªA‚µ‚΂µ‚¨‚‚«‚ ‚¢‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

2005-03-18

¡”N—\’肵‚Ä‚¢‚é3‚‚̎dŽ–‚ɁAƒƒh‚ª—§‚Á‚Ä‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚±‚ê‚Å‚µ‚΂炭‘Å‚¿Ž~‚ß‚Å‚·B

2005-03-14

T––AŒˆ’蕶‚ð“Ç‚Ý‚Ü‚µ‚½BŠÖS‚ðŽ‚Á‚½‚̂́AŽÐŠOŽæ’÷–ð‚Ì‹@”\A“Æ‹Ö–@‚ÌŠÏ“_A•ú‘—‚ÌŒö‹¤«‚Ì‚R“_‚Å‚·B

2005-03-04

ƒOƒŠ[ƒ“ƒy[ƒp[A¡’©“ǂݏI‚¦‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚È‚©‚È‚©”÷–­‚È‚Æ‚±‚낪‘½‚¢‚Å‚·‚ˁB

2005-02-28

Revlon duty‚È‚Ç‚à‹c˜_‚É‚Ì‚Ú‚Á‚Ä‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½BŽQl‚Æ‚µ‚āATakeover Regulation After the 'Convergence' of Corporate Law‚ð‚²Ð‰î‚µ‚Ä‚¨‚«‚Ü‚·B

2005-02-21

ƒƒfƒBƒA‚̏Š—LE‡•¹‹K§“™‚Ɋ֐S‚ªW‚Ü‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA–{“úcommitment‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚½Capital Radio/GWR GroupA‚©‚‚Ăٍ̐e‚È‚Ç‚ªŽè‘±‚«ã‚ÌŽQl‚É‚È‚é‚©‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2005-02-07

ƒVƒ‰ƒN‘哝—̊̐÷‚è‚ÌFrench International News ChanneliCFIIj‚́A‚Ü‚¸‚Ístate aid notification‚ª‘æˆêŠÖ–å‚É‚È‚é‚悤‚Å‚·i3000–œƒ†[ƒ‚𐭕{oŽ‘‚Ì—\’èjBicf. France to launch global TV newsj

2005-01-17

kÐ\”NB¡“ú“I‚ɍl‚¦‚Ä‚àA‚Ü‚¾‚Ü‚¾–Y‚ê‚ç‚ê‚é‚à‚Ì‚Å‚Í‚ ‚è‚Ü‚¹‚ñB

2005-01-11

XV‚ð–Y‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½‘Ð‚ðƒ‰ƒCƒuƒ‰ƒŠ[‚ɒljÁ‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2005-01-04

¡”N‚±‚»‚͉½‚Æ‚©A‚à‚¤­‚µŒ©‚â‚·‚¢ƒTƒCƒg‚ð–ÚŽw‚µ‚½‚¢‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¨‚è‚Ü‚·B

2004-12-30

’Z‚¢‚悤‚Å’·‚¢ˆê”N‚Å‚µ‚½BV”N‚à‚Ü‚½A‚æ‚낵‚­‚¨Šè‚¢’v‚µ‚Ü‚·B

2004-12-14

‰·‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚éƒe[ƒ}‚ð‚¢‚Â‚à‚Ì‚Æ‚±‚ë‚ÉŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ç‚ê‚à“ï‘è‚Å‚·‚ªAV”N‚É‚º‚Ђ±‚È‚µ‚½‚¢‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2004-11-11

‚©‚‚ñ‚±‚Å‚à‚²Ð‰î‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAWeber ShandwickŽÐ‚ÌInteractive Guide to the EU‚ªV‚µ‚­‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BÅ‹ß‹L‰¯—Í‚ªŠ‚¦‚Ä‚«‚½‚¹‚¢‚à‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAŠî‘b“I‚È‚±‚Æ‚ª‚¤‚Ü‚­‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚èA‚Æ‚Ä‚àd•ó‚µ‚Ü‚·B

2004-11-04

EstALŽŸ†ŒfÚ‚̘_•¶‚ɂ‚«Aˆê‰žA–³Ž–‚É’Ee‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2004-11-01

ˆÏˆõ‰ïlŽ–‚Ì‚²‚½‚²‚½iƒ‚ƒ“ƒeƒBŽ•œŠˆ‚Ì–Ú‚àHj‚Í‘±‚¢‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªAEUŒ›–@ð–ñ‚Ì’²ˆó‚ªs‚í‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B‘Ώƕ\‚­‚è‚ɋ΂µ‚ñ‚Å‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‚È‚©‚È‚©‘å•Ï‚Å‚·B

2004-10-23

‚Ü‚¸‚à‚Á‚āA”íÐ’n‚Ì•ûX‚É‚¨Œ©•‘‚¢\‚µã‚°‚Ü‚·B

2004-10-07

coordinated effect‚Å‚µ‚΂µ‹c˜_‚ª”’”M‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚½from Chicago to BrusselsiOFT VickersƒXƒs[ƒ` 2004-09-03ŽQÆj‚ÌŠwK‚ª‘æŽO’iŠKunilateral effect‚ɍ·‚µŠ|‚©‚èA‚悤‚â‚­“ú–{–@‚É–ß‚Á‚Ä‚­‚邱‚Æ‚ªo—ˆ‚Ü‚µ‚½BgŽsêŽx”z—́hi‚ÉŒÀ‚è‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ªj’è‹`‚Ì‚í‚ȁFfbuilds vagueness upon vaguenessf (Elhauge)‚ª–Ú‚ÉŽc‚è‚Ü‚·B

2004-09-29

ƒ„ƒ}ƒg‰^—A‚̃P[ƒX‚́A86ð‚Å‚ ‚ê87ð‚Å‚ ‚êA‰¢B‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì“Á’¥‚ð‰ü‚߂čۗ§‚½‚¹‚é‚à‚Ì‚Æ‘¨‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚Ü‚½Ž„‚ÌDissertation‚ł͕č‘‚ÌState Action‚ð”äŠr‚̑ΏۂƂµ‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA“§‚©‚µ‚Ä“Ç‚ñ‚Å‚à‚炦‚ê‚΂Ǝv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2004-09-13

FCC‚ªƒLƒbƒYƒy[ƒW‚ðì‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA‚±‚̃Lƒƒƒ‰ƒNƒ^[cB

2004-08-13

V‰¢BˆÏˆõ‰ï‚̐w—e‚̃|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚́AInformation Society and Media‚ÆCompetition‚ÌKroes—Žj‚Å‚µ‚傤‚©B

2004-08-10

Framework Directive Article 7‚ÉŠî‚­Phase II (eserious doubtsf)‚̃P[ƒX‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BŠe‘‹K§‹@ŠÖ‚ÆECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚Æ‚ÌŒ©‰ð‚̈Ⴂ‚ÌŒ»‚í‚êi‚±‚±‚Å‚ÍSMPŽw’èjA‚Æ‚¢‚¤‚±‚Æ‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAˆÏˆõ‰ï‚ÌŽvlE•ªÍƒvƒƒZƒX‚ª“§‚¯‚ÄŒ©‚¦‚邽‚߁A”ñí‚É‹»–¡[‚¢Œ¤‹†Þ—¿‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚­‚à‚Ì‚ÆŽv‚í‚ê‚Ü‚·B

2004-07-02

TV2‚̃P[ƒX‚ɂ‚¢‚āAƒfƒ“ƒ}[ƒN­•{‚ÍECJ‚Ö‚Ì’ñ‘i‚ðŒˆ’è‚µ‚½‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·i 2004-05-20jB•âˆâFCase T-309/04‚Æ‚µ‚ÄOJ‚ÉŒfÚ‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½i 2004-10-25jB

2004-06-07

EC‚ÌTetra Laval/SidelA•Ä‘‚ÌMicrosoft‚È‚Ç‚à‚»‚¤‚Å‚·‚ªAremedy‚ª‚¢‚í‚ä‚ésˆ×‹K§‚̏ꍇA‚»‚̈ێEŠÄŽ‹‚ª‘åØ‚ȃ|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚·BCRR‚Æ‚¢‚¤•¡ŽG‚Èremedy‚ð‰Û‚µ‚½Carlton/Granada‚ÌAdjudicatorƒŒƒrƒ…[‚ðŒ©‚Ä‚¢‚ÄŠ´‚¶‚Ü‚µ‚½Bˆê•ûA‚±‚¤‚µ‚½remedy‚»‚Ì‚à‚̂́A‚»‚à‚»‚à‚̑Ó–«‚ÌŒŸ“¢‚Æ‚¢‚¤ˆÓ–¡‚ł́A‚±‚ê‚ç‚Ü‚¾’~Ï‚̏­‚È‚¢Ž‘—¿‚É—Š‚邵‚©‚È‚­A’[‚ɂ‚¢‚½‚΂©‚è‚Å‚ ‚èA‚³‚ç‚ÉŒ¤‹†‚ª•K—v‚È•ª–ì‚Å‚ ‚é‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·i‹ÆŠE‚ɐ¸’Ê‚µ‚½lŠÔ‚µ‚©—‰ð‚µ‚É‚­‚¢‚à‚̂ɂȂ肪‚¿‚È“_‚àŠÜ‚߂ājB

2004-05-21

State Aid‚ðê–å‚Æ‚·‚éƒuƒ‰ƒbƒZƒ‹‚Ì•Ù��m‚©‚çAˆÏˆõ‰ïAÙ”»Š‚̍ŐV“®Œü‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ì‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚ð‚à‚ç‚¢‚Ü‚µ‚½iIn-house CounselŒü‚¯jBŽÀ–±i‚±‚±‚ł͔퍐‘¤‚Å‚·‚ˁjƒTƒCƒh‚É‚à’ml‚ª‚¢‚é‚̂́AŒƒ‚µ‚­“®‚¢‚Ä‚¢‚镪–ì‚ð’Ç‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚éŽÒ‚Æ‚µ‚ẮA”ñí‚É‹~‚í‚ê‚Ü‚·iƒAƒEƒgƒvƒbƒg‚ʼn¶•Ô‚µ‚Å‚«‚Ä‚¢‚È‚¢‚Ì‚Í–â‘è‚Å‚·‚ªcjB

2004-05-20

ƒfƒ“ƒ}[ƒNTV2‚ɂ‚¢‚āAˆÏˆõ‰ïŒˆ’肪o‚Ü‚µ‚½Bˆê‰ž]—ˆ‚̍l‚¦•û‚ɉˆ‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªAreimbursement‚ªo‚½‚½‚߁A‚Ç‚Ì’ö“x‹l‚ß‚Ä‚«‚½‚©Aofficial text‚ª‘Ò‚½‚ê‚Ü‚·B

2004-05-13

Services of general interest‚ɂ‚¢‚āA‘Ò‚½‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½White Paper‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BŒ›–@ð–ñ‘ˆÄ‚𐳖ʂ©‚瑨‚¦‚½“à—e‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2004-04-26

‹vX‚̃P[ƒX‚Æ‚µ‚āATelenor/Canal+/Canal Digital‚ðT––‚É“Ç‚Ý‚Ü‚µ‚½B¡‚Ì‚Æ‚±‚ëÙegŠ¨Šh‚ðŠO‚ê‚é‚à‚Ì‚Å‚Í‚ ‚è‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ªAbroadbandADTTŽsê‚Ö‚ÌŒ¾‹y‚ª‘‚µA‚»‚̈ʒu‚¯‚ª‹c˜_‚É‚È‚è‚‚‚ ‚é‚Ì‚ðŠ´‚¶‚Ü‚·B

2004-04-08

5ŒŽ1“úŽ{s‚ÌRegulation 1/2003‚ÌŒ»ŽÀ–¡‚ðŽÀŠ´‚Å‚«‚郊ƒŠ[ƒX‚ª‘‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BOFT‚Í‚±‚ê‚É•¹‚¹A•ªŒ ‰»‚ƁfnotificationfƒVƒXƒeƒ€“P”p‚ɑΉž‚µ‚½ƒKƒCƒhƒ‰ƒCƒ“ŒQˆêŽ®‚ðƒpƒuƒRƒ‚É‚©‚¯‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚Ü‚½VTTBE‚ªo‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA‚±‚¿‚ç‚àAArticle 81(3) EC‚̈µ‚¢‚ªfnotificationfƒVƒXƒeƒ€ifcommand and controlf•ûŽ®j‚©‚çfself-assessmentf•ûŽ®‚ɂȂ邱‚Æ‚ðˆÓŽ¯‚µ‚½“à—e‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2004-03-24

‚«‚傤o‚éMicrosoftŒˆ’è‚ɂ‚¢‚āAƒAƒiƒŠƒXƒg‚Ì•ªÍ‚ªoŽn‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BŽ„‚ÌŒ©•·‚«‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚é”͈͂ł́AMichelin v Commission(Case 322/81)ˆÈ—ˆ‚Ìdominant firm‚́fspecial responsibilityf‚ɐG‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚à‚Ì‚ª‘½‚¢‚悤‚Å‚·Bc‚Á‚ƁAMontiŽ‚̃Xƒe[ƒgƒƒ“ƒg‚ªo‰ñ‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚½‚¾‚¯‚©‚à‚µ‚ê‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ˁiÎE2004-03-25•t‹LjB

2004-03-17

AOK”»Œˆ‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B‹£‘ˆ–@‚ª‚Ç‚±‚Ü‚Åsickness fund associations‚É“K—p‚Å‚«‚é‚©‚ªÅ“_‚Å‚µ‚½‚ªAð”N‚ÌAG JacobsˆÓŒ©‚ðÌ—p‚¹‚¸A‚»‚à‚»‚àfmerely perform a task for German social security systemf, fdo not act as undertakings engaging in economic activityf‚Æ”»’f‚µA‚»‚̈Ӗ¡‚ł͐悾‚Á‚Ă̕čō‚Ù‚É‚æ‚éFlamingo”»Œˆ‚Æ”äŠr‚Å‚«‚é‚à‚Ì‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2004-02-20

IBA Health v OFT‚ÉŒ‹˜_‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚¨‚ë‚»‚©‚É‚µ‚ª‚¿‚È‚Æ‚±‚ë‚ÉŒµ–§‚È•ªÍ‚ð’ñ‹Ÿ‚µ‚Ä‚­‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·Bicf. 2004-02-03j

2004-02-11

OFT‚ÌVickersŽ‚̃Xƒs[ƒ`‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BVECMR‚̘_“_‚É‚È‚Á‚½fdominance testf or eSLC testf‚ÅŒãŽÒ‚ð‹­‚­„‚µ‚½Ž‚ªAÅI“I‚ɍ̂ç‚ꂽfSIEC testf‚ð‚ǂ̂悤‚É•]‰¿‚·‚é‚©’š”J‚ɏ‘‚©‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚èA•×‹­‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚·B

2004-02-03

‚ ‚·A‚ ‚³‚Á‚ĂƏŠ—p‚ŃAƒbƒvƒf[ƒg‚ð‚¨‹x‚Ý‚µ‚Ü‚·B‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

FT‚É‚à‹LŽ–‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAOFT‚Ìdiscretion•‚ð–₤T‘iR‚ªŠJŽn‚³‚ꂽ‚悤‚Å‚·Bicf. UK Court of AppealA OFT@2003-12-05, 12-11j

2004-01-21

‚±‚ê‚Ü‚Å‚à“–ƒTƒCƒg‚ŃtƒHƒ[‚µ‚Ä‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAEC‚̐V‡•¹‹K‘¥iƒKƒCƒhƒ‰ƒCƒ“j‚ªA“Œ•ûŠg‘å‚ÌŠú“ú‚ƍ‡‚킹‚Ä“K—p‚³‚ê‚邱‚ƂŁAÅI“I‚ÉŠt—»—Ž–‰ï‚Å”F‰Â‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2004-01-14

Trinko”»Œˆ‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2004-01-06

DTI‚É‘±‚«AOfcom‚©‚ç‚àpublic interest testƒKƒCƒ_ƒ“ƒX‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2004-01-05

–¾‚¯‚Ü‚µ‚Ä‚¨‚ß‚Å‚Æ‚¤‚²‚´‚¢‚Ü‚·B¡”N‚à‚æ‚낵‚­‚¨Šè‚¢’v‚µ‚Ü‚·B

‹x‚Ý’†‚ɕč‘‚ÌState Action Doctrine‚ɂ‚¢‚āAÅV‚Ì“®Œü‚ð‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚Ä’²‚ׂ܂µ‚½BMario MontiŽ‚ª‚ÅEC‹£‘ˆ–@‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä’‚é‚Æ‚«AState Aidƒ‹[ƒ‹‚ª—m‚Ì“Œ¼‚ōłàˆÙ‚È‚éŠT”OA‚Æ‚±‚ê‚Ü‚ÅŒ¾‚Á‚Ä—ˆ‚Ä‚¢‚½‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªA•K‚¸‚µ‚à³‚µ‚­–³‚¢‚悤‚È‹C‚ª‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BLLM paper‚ÉŒü‚¯‚ẮA‚Æ‚Ä‚à—L‚è“ï‚¢Š´G‚Å‚·‚ªcB

2003-12-26

¡”N‚àˆê”NA‚¢‚ë‚¢‚ë‚È•û‚ɁA‚³‚Ü‚´‚Ü‚¨¢˜b‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚±‚̏ê‚ð‚¨ŽØ‚è‚µ‚āAŒä—ç\‚µã‚°‚Ü‚·BV”N‚Í5“ú‚©‚çÄŠJ‚·‚é—\’è‚Å‚·B

2003-12-24

Parmalat‚Ìrescue plan‚ð‚ß‚®‚èA‰¢B‚Å‚ÍState Aid‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ì‹c˜_‚ª‘›‚ª‚µ‚­‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·B‚â‚͂萭Ž¡‚Ƃ͐؂Á‚Ä‚àØ‚ê‚È‚¢ƒRƒ“ƒZƒvƒg‚Å‚ ‚邱‚Æ‚ª•ª‚©‚è‚Ü‚·i‚½‚Ü‚½‚܍¡”Nˆê”t‚̓Cƒ^ƒŠƒA‚ª‹c’·‘‚Å‚·‚µj‚ªA–@‹Zp“I‚É‚Í‚¢‚­‚‚©‚Ì‘I‘ðŽˆ‚ª‚ ‚èA‹»–¡[‚¢‚Å‚·iƒI[ƒ\ƒhƒbƒNƒX‚ÈŒ©•û‚̎菕‚¯‚Æ‚µ‚āAGuidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in DifficultyjB

‚Ü‚½AHughes/Newscorp‚ɂ‚¢‚āAFCCEDOJ‚̈ӌ©‚ªo‘µ‚¢‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-12-15

‚¢‚ë‚¢‚ë‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªA‚Ü‚¸A‰ü³Communications ActAEnterprise Act‚ÌŽ{s“ú‚ªŒˆ‚Ü‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚ ‚ƁA10ŒŽ‚ɍs‚í‚ꂽIBC‚ÌCommunications and EC Competition LawƒJƒ“ƒtƒ@ƒŒƒ“ƒX‚ÌŽ‘—¿‚ª“Í‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½BƒRƒ~ƒ…ƒjƒP[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“i—X•ÖŠÜ‚ށj•ª–ì‚ł̍ŐV“®Œü‚ª•ª‚©‚èAd•ó‚µ‚Ü‚·B

2003-12-01

Competitiveness Council‚Å10”N‰z‚µ‚̈ȏAtakeover bids‚ª³”F‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½Bopt outð€•t‚«‚Æ‚È‚Á‚½‚½‚߁AˆÏˆõ‰ï‚Í”½‘Έӌ©‚ð•\–¾‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BŒ»ÝAEU–@‚ÌŠwK‚ª‰ïŽÐ–@‚É“ü‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAMember StateŠÔ‚Ì—ðŽj“I·ˆÙiŽå‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‘å—¤–@E‰p•Ä–@j‚ª‘å‚«‚­A‚È‚©‚È‚©‹ê˜J‚µ‚Ü‚·iDaily MailACentrosAUberseering•Ó‚肪Žå—v”»—á‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚傤‚©jB‚½‚¾AEuropean Company Statute‚ÉŠî‚­SE‚ª“oê‚µ‚悤‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚é‚È‚©Afreedom of establishment‚Ì“]Š·Šú‚È‚Ì‚ÍŽ–ŽÀ‚̂悤‚Å‚·B

2003-11-21

State Aid’è‹`‚ɂ܂‚í‚épendingƒP[ƒX‚Ì‚à‚¤‚ЂƂAGEMO‚ɂ‚«AECJ‚Ì»’f‚ª‰º‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ü‚¾‘S•¶‚ªƒAbƒv‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ªAfmitigates the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertakingfŠî€i–{”»Œˆ‚ł́fthe financial costcthe disposal of animal carcasses and slaughterhouse waste must be considered to be an inherent cost of the economic activitiesfj‚ªƒ|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚©‚ÆŽv‚í‚ê‚Ü‚·B

2003-11-17

Carlton/Granada‚Ìremedy plan‚ª³”F‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½Bƒ|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚Æ‚È‚Á‚½CRR‚ɂ‚¢‚ẮAÚ×‚Èà–¾‚ª•t‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-11-10

‚Q“ú‚Ù‚ÇŠO‹Î‚Ì‚½‚߁AŽŸ‰ñ‚̍XV‚Í‹à—j“ú‚Æ‚È‚è‚Ü‚·B‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

2003-10-27

ƒLƒƒƒmƒ“‚Ö‚ÌŒöŽæˆÏ—§“ü‚茟¸‚ª˜b‘è‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¨‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAŽQl‚Æ‚È‚è‚»‚¤‚ÈECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚̃P[ƒX‚Æ‚µ‚āAInfo-Lab/Ricoh(Competition Policy Newsletter 1999, number 1 February at 35)‚ðŒf‚°‚Ä‚¨‚«‚Ü‚·B

FTC‚ÌState Action‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚郌ƒ|[ƒg‚ð“ǂݐi‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BEU‚ÌState Aid‚Æ‚Ì”äŠrA“ú–{‚Ì“Æ‹Ö–@‚Ö‚ÌŽ¦´‚Æ‚¢‚¤•¶–¬‚łЂƂ‰½‚©‘‚¯‚ê‚΁c‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA”Ž˜_ƒŒƒxƒ‹‚©‚à‚µ‚ê‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ˁiÎjB

2003-10-16

ƒCƒ^ƒŠƒARAIAƒ|ƒ‹ƒgƒKƒ‹RTPAƒXƒyƒCƒ“RTVE‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éState Aid‚̃P[X‚É”»’f‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BAltmark Transi 2003-07-23j‚ÅState Aid‚Ì’è‹`‚ªŒˆ’…‚ðŒ©‚½‚Ì‚ðŽó‚¯‚āA”»’f‚ÉŽŠ‚Á‚½‚à‚Ì‚ÆŽv‚í‚ê‚Ü‚·B2001”N”­o‚̃Rƒ~ƒ…ƒjƒP[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“iÙ–ó‚ ‚èj‚É’‰ŽÀ‚ɏ]‚Á‚½‚à‚Ì‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

‚Ü‚½Herbert UngererŽ‚̃Xƒs[ƒ`‚́A•ú‘—Œ ‚Æ‹£‘ˆ–@‚ð‚ß‚®‚éÅ‹ß‚̃gƒsƒbƒN‚ª‚æ‚­•ª‚©‚é‚à‚Ì‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-10-08

‰p“ñ‘å–¯•úCarlton/Granada‚̍‡•¹‚ɃS[ƒTƒCƒ“‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BŠî–{“I‚È•ªÍŽ‹Šp‚͋߁Xo‚éÙe‚Ì’Ê‚è‚Å‚·iPersonal Archives‚ɍŏIŒˆ’è‚ðŽó‚¯‚Ä‚Ì•âˆâ‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½j‚ªAremedy‚ð„‚Á‚Ä‚Ì‹c˜_‚à‹»–¡[‚¢‚à‚Ì‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B•ú‘—Ž–‹Æ‚Å‚ ‚邽‚߁AITC‚âOfcom“™‹@ŠÖ‚Ì–¼‘O‚ª“ü‚藐‚ê‚謗‚µ‚Ü‚·‚ªACCƒŒƒ|[ƒg‚̃RƒA‚Æ‚µ‚ẮAƒeƒŒƒrLŽsê‚É‚¨‚¢‚臕¹‰ïŽÐ‚ªŽ‚ÂŽsêŽx”z—͂ɑ΂µAdivestmenti­”ˆÓŒ©‚ ‚èj‚Å‚Í‚È‚­behavioural‚ÈŽè’i‚É‚æ‚Á‚Ä”ƒ‚¢Žè‚ÌŒðÂ—Í‚ðˆÛŽ‚µA‹£‘ˆ‚ð’S•Û‚µ‚悤‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-11-07

–ß‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½BŽæ‚è‹}‚¬A‹C•t‚¢‚½ƒwƒbƒhƒ‰ƒCƒ“‚̂ݒljÁ‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-10-28

Š—p‚ɂāA‚µ‚΂µ‹x‰É‚𒸂«‚Ü‚·BŽŸ‰ñXV‚Í11ŒŽ7“ú‚Ì—\’è‚Å‚·B‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

2003-10-07

Critical Loss Analysis‚ðƒxƒ‹ƒgƒ‰ƒ“‹£‘ˆ‚ÌŠÏ“_‚©‚ç”á”»“I‚ÉŒŸ“¢‚·‚éFTCƒGƒRƒmƒ~ƒXƒg‚̃y[ƒp[‚ð“Ç‚ñ‚Å‚¢‚Ü‚·B¡“xƒuƒ‰ƒbƒZƒ‹‚ōs‚í‚ê‚éanti-trust economist‚́gƒP[ƒXƒXƒ^ƒfƒBŽÀ’nŒP—ûh‚ÉŽQ‰Á‚µ‚悤‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAÅ‹ßA‚Æ‚Ý‚É‚±‚Ì•Ó‚è‚Ì”\—Í•s‘«‚ð’ÉŠ´‚µ‚Ü‚·B

2003-10-03

IMS Health‚ÌŽc‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚éƒp[ƒg‚ɂ‚¢‚āAAG Tizzano‚̈ӌ©‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BSecondary market—vŒ‚̐¸ãk‰»‚ªƒ|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚Å‚µ‚傤‚©B

2003-10-02

Regulation 1/2003‚𒆊j‚Æ‚·‚é"Modernisation Package"‚ւ̈ӌ©•åW‚ªŽn‚Ü‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½BŠÖ˜A‚·‚éƒy[ƒp[‚à‘‚µ‚Ä‚«‚Ä‚¨‚èA—’‚Ì‘O‚̐¯‚³‚©‚çA—’–{‘Ì‚Ö“ü‚Á‚Ä‚«‚½Š´‚¶‚Å‚·BEU–@‚̃RƒA‚Å‚ ‚éSupremacyADirect EffectARemedies“™Žå—vŠT”O‚Ì—‰ð‚Ì•K—v«‚ª‰ü‚ß‚ÄŠ´‚¶‚ç‚ê‚Ü‚·B

2003-10-01

¡‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚鏑‚«•¨‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é”õ–Y˜^‚È‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªA10ŒŽ2“ú‚ÉC-418/01 IMS Health‚̃P[ƒX‚ÌAdvocate GeneralˆÓŒ©‚ªo‚é–Í—l‚Å‚·B

ƒ}ƒXƒRƒ~“I‚É‚ÍCFI‚ªTrans-Atlantic Conference Agreementicollective dominance‚ð”F’èECFI‚àŽxŽj‚Ö‚ÌECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚̉ے¥‹àŒˆ’è‚𕢂µ‚½‚±‚Æ‚É’–Ú‚·‚é‚Æ‚±‚ë‚Å‚µ‚傤‚ªAŽ„‚̊֐S‚©‚ç‚·‚é‚ƁA‘¼‚̃P[ƒXŒQ‚à‚È‚©‚È‚©‹»–¡[‚¢‚Å‚·B

2003-09-29

ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚̃TƒCƒg‚ª–éŠÔ‚Ƀƒ“ƒeƒiƒ“ƒX‚É“ü‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·BPhilip LoweŽ‚̃Cƒ“ƒ^ƒrƒ…[‚ªŒfÚ‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Í‚¸‚Å‚·‚ªAŒãƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚·B

2003-09-26

technology transfer agreements‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é81ð3€‚ÌRegulation, GuidelinesˆÄ‚ªŒö•\‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B2004”N5ŒŽ1“ú”­Œø—\’è‚ŁAEUŠg‘å‚É”º‚¤‚¢‚í‚ä‚émodernisation‚É‚æ‚é‹£‘ˆ–@ŠŠÇ‚Ì•ªŒ ‰»‚É‚ ‚킹‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·iyŒp‘±ƒgƒsƒbƒNƒXz‚ÉŠÈ’P‚È‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚ ‚èjB

2003-09-18

ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚æ‚èA10ŒŽ4“úŠJŽn‚ÌIGC‚ÉŒü‚¯AŒ›–@ð–ñ‘ˆÄ‚̉ü³ˆÄ‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-09-09

ECð–ñ82ð‚́eabusef‚Ìrefinement‚ð’Ç‚¤ˆêŠÑ‚Æ‚µ‚āAEssential Facilities Doctrine‚ÆŠÖ˜A•t‚¯‚Đ®—‚³‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚Ì‘½‚¢ƒP[ƒXA˜_•¶‚ð“Ç‚Ý•Ô‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BCommercial SolventsATelemarketingiCBEMjAMagillALadbrokeABronnerAIMS Healthc‚ƁAƒƒfƒBƒAŠÖŒW‚ª‘½‚¢‚±‚Ƃɉü‚ß‚Ä‹C•t‚«‚Ü‚·B

2003-08-25

‰¢B‚Ì•ÙŒìŽm‚Ì’ml“™‚ªvŒ£‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚éin-house lawyerŒü‚¯‚ÌEC‹£‘ˆ–@‚ÌŽèˆø‚«‚ð‚½‚Ü‚½‚Ü“üŽè‚Å‚«‚Ü‚µ‚āAECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚Ì”»’fAECÙ”»Š‚Ì”»—Ⴊ’è‚Ü‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚È‚¢•”•ª‚𒆐S‚É‚Ï‚ç‚Ï‚ç’­‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·i‚Æ‚Ä‚à•ªŒú‚¢‚Ì‚Å‚·jBƒNƒ‰ƒCƒAƒ“ƒg‚̉ۑè‰ðŒˆ‚Ì‚½‚߂ɁwŽg‚¤xŠÏ“_‚É“O‚µ‚½”»—áEð—‚̐®—‚ª‚ ‚炽‚߂ĐV‘N‚Å‚ ‚é‚Æ‚Æ‚à‚ɁAh–ڂ̂‚¯‚Ç‚±‚ëh‚ÌŸ¼—{‚ɖ𗧂¿‚Ü‚·B‚ ‚ƁABBC Online Service‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚郊ƒŠ[ƒX‚ð2ŒAŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-08-11

ð”N––‚ÉECMR‚̉ü³ˆÄ‚ªECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚ð’Ê‚èA‚»‚Ì‚È‚©‚̐…•½‡•¹‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éNotice‚Åparamount market positionisingle-firm dominancejAnon-collusive oligopoliesAco-ordinationicollective dominancej‚Ì‚RŠT”O‚ª®—‚³‚êA•Ä‘—¬‚ÅŒ¾‚¦‚ΑO“ñŽÒ‚ªunilateral effectsA‚»‚µ‚čŌオcoordinated effects‚É•ª—Þ‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BÅ‹ß‚ ‚¿‚ç‚ł́AŠ®‘S‚ȐVŠT”O‚Æ‚È‚énon-collusive oligopolies‚É–@ŠwŽÒEŒoÏŠwŽÒ‚Ì’–Ú‚ªW‚Ü‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚µ‚āA˜_•¶E”­•\‚ªW‚Ü‚è‚‚‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B‰Ä‹x‚݂̏h‘è‚Æ‚µ‚Đ®—‚Å‚«‚ê‚΂Ǝv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªcB‚Æ‚±‚ë‚ŁA‚±‚ÌŽQl‚É‚È‚éƒy[ƒp[‚ðŒ©‚Â‚¯‚Ü‚µ‚½BEmpirical Analyses of Competitive Effects of MergeriFTCj‚Å‚·B

2003-08-06

ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚ÌCompetition Policy Letter iNumber 2 – Summer 2003j‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½i 2003-07-25‚ÉŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA“ú•t‚ª•ÏX‚³‚ꂽ‚Ì‚Å 2003-08-05‚Ɉڂµ‚Ä‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·jB‚±‚±‚µ‚΂炭‚̃P[ƒX“™‚ɂ‚¢‚āA’S“–Š¯‚̉ðà‚ªs‚í‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚´‚Á‚ƍŋ߂̗¬‚ê‚ðŒ©“n‚·‚Ì‚É•Ö—˜‚È‚à‚̂ŁAŒÂl“I‚É‚Í‚Æ‚Ä‚àd•ó‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-07-25

UEFA Champions League‚Ìjoint selling agreementAƒhƒCƒc‚Ìradio spectrum allocation“™‹»–¡[‚¢ˆÄŒ‚ª‚¢‚­‚‚©o‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-07-24

State Aid‚Ì’è‹`‚𑈂Á‚Ä‚¢‚éƒP[ƒX‚̂ЂƂAAltmark Trans‚Ì”»Œˆ‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BŠwà“I‚ȏڍׂȈʒu•t‚¯‚Í’Ç‚Á‚ătƒHƒ[‚µ‚Ü‚·‚ªAfState Aidf Approach‚͔ے肳‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-07-22

Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe‚ÆCommunications Act 2003‚ªƒAƒbƒv‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½i 2003-07-18jB‘OŽÒ‚ł͍ēxAð•¶‚ª‚¸‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚Ä81ðE82ðE86ð‚͇V-50ðE‡V-51ðE‡V-55ð‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BIGC‚Ì‹c˜_‚ÌŠÔ‚É‚Ü‚½‚¸‚ê‚é‚Å‚µ‚傤‚¯‚ê‚Ç‚àiÎjBŒãŽÒ‚ł́A“K—pœŠO‚̏­‚È‚¢Enterprise Act 2002‚ւ̏C³‚ª‚¢‚­‚‚©“ü‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½BFCC‚̐V‹K‘¥‚àã‰@‚ÅŽ~‚ß‚ç‚ê‚»‚¤‚Ȑ¨‚¢‚Å‚·‚µA—ÞŽ—“_‚ªŒ©‚¢‚¾‚¹‚é‚Ì‚©‚à‚µ‚ê‚Ü‚¹‚ñB

2003-07-17

WanadooiAKZO testjAYamahaimarket partitioningj‚ƉߋŽ‚ÌEC‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì—¬‚ê‚ðŠm”F‚Å‚«‚éƒP[ƒX‚ªŒö•\‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ü‚½AŒoÏ•ªÍdŽ‹‚̈ê’[‚Æ‚µ‚Ä–ñ‘©‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½Chief Competition Economist‚ÌŽw–¼‚às‚í‚ꂽ‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·B

2003-06-27

ƒƒLƒVƒR‚ÌICN‘æ“ñ‰ñƒJƒ“ƒtƒ@ƒŒƒ“ƒXŠÖ˜A‚̃Šƒ“ƒN‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BŽ©‚¸‚©‚獑Û”äŠr‚ÌŽ‹–ì‚à“ü‚èA‹»–¡[‚¢‚Å‚·B

2003-06-18

EUŒ›–@ð–ñ‚̃hƒ‰ƒtƒg‚ð‰É‚ð‚݂‚¯‚ēǂݐi‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·c¡“x‚́A81ðE82ðE86ð‚͇V-47ðE‡V-48ðE‡V-52ð‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ˁi‹êÎjB

‚Ü‚½Carlton/Granada‚̃P[ƒX‚ɂ‚¢‚āACC‚Ìremedyƒvƒƒ|[ƒUƒ‹‚ª‚Q‚’ljÁ‚µ‚ÄŽ¦‚³‚êADTI‚Ö‚Ì•ñYØ‚ª8ŒŽ26“ú‚܂ʼn„’·‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-06-17

BBC‚ÆBskyB‚ÌEPG‚ð‚ß‚®‚é–â‘肪‰ðŒˆ‚µAITC‚ÌNotice‚ào‚Ü‚µ‚½B 2003-06-13‚ɂ܂Ƃ߂ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-06-16

ƒeƒbƒTƒƒjƒL‚ÖŒü‚¯‚āAEUŒ›–@ð–ñ‚̃hƒ‰ƒtƒg‚ªo‘µ‚Á‚½‚Ì‚É•¹‚¹Ai‚悤‚â‚­‚Å‚·‚ªjƒ|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚É’…Žè‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B‘哝—́AŠO‘Š‚̐ݒu‚È‚Ç‚ª’–Ú‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‘å‚«‚ȃ|ƒCƒ“ƒg‚́AŒ`Ž®ã‚Æ‚Í‚¢‚¦A¡‚Ü‚Å‚Ì‚R–{‚Ì’Œ‚ªiŠT‚ˁj‚P–{‚É“ˆê‚³‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚É‚ ‚é‚ƍl‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BCharter of Fundamental Rights‚ª‘g‚ݍž‚Ü‚êA‚悤‚â‚­–¼ŽÀ‚Æ‚à‚ÉEC‚©‚ç’E‹p‚Å‚«‚邱‚Ɓi‚±‚ꂪ–³‚¢‚½‚ß‚É'EC'Ù”»Š‚Í‹ê˜J‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½j‚Í‘å‚«‚È•ÏŠv‚Å‚µ‚傤B

—Ⴆ‚΁AƒƒfƒBƒA‚ÌŽ‹“_‚©‚猾‚¤‚ƁA'The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.' (Article 11(2)), 'Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity' (Article 22), 'Access to services of general economic interest' (Article 36)i‚»‚ꂼ‚êCharter of Fundamental Rights of EU‚̌Ăі¼`¡‰ñ‚Ì‘ˆÄ‚Å‚Í‚»‚Ì‚Ü‚ÜPart II‚Ƀrƒ‹ƒgƒCƒ“‚³‚ê‚éj“™‚Ìð€‚ªA–@“I‚É–¾Šm‚Ɉʒu•t‚¯‚ç‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚·B¡ŒãAEU–@‚ðŠw‚ÔŽÒ‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‹C‚É‚È‚é“_‚́A‚±‚ê‚܂ł̏ð–ñ‚Írepeal‚³‚ê‚邪AVŒ›–@ð–ñ‚ɉˆ‚Á‚½“àŽÀ‚͈ø‚«Œp‚ª‚ê‚é‚Æ‚¢‚¤“‚¢’²®ì‹Æ‚ª‚ǂ̂悤‚ɐi‚Þ‚©A‚Å‚·iEuropean Convention‚͍¡‰ñA‚»‚̍¢“‚ðŽw“E‚·‚é‚É—¯‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·jB

‚Ü‚½A‹£‘ˆ–@ŠÖ˜A‚Å‚¢‚¦‚΁Aƒj[ƒXð–ñ‚ʼn”\‚Æ‚È‚Á‚½ACFI“à‚Éa specialized competition chamberÝ’u‚·‚é’ñˆÄiÙ”»§“x‰üŠvj‚Æ‚ÌŠÖŒW‚à‘z‹N‚³‚ê‚Ü‚·B

2003-06-05

—X•ÖƒT[ƒrƒX‚Ì”½ƒgƒ‰ƒXƒg–@ã‚̈ʒu•t‚¯‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ì‘ˆ‚¢‚ªAÅ‚Ù‚ÅŒˆ‚¹‚ç‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚¿‚å‚Á‚Æ’x‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA 2003-05-27‚ɂ܂Ƃ߂ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ä‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·BPetition‚̈ӌ©‚Í‚È‚©‚È‚©‹»–¡[‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Å‚·B

2003-06-03

—\’è’Ê‚èA‚Å‚Í‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAFCCAITC‚æ‚è‚»‚ꂼ‚ê”­•\‚ªo‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-05-22

Services of General Interest‚Éւ·‚éƒOƒŠ[ƒ“ƒy[ƒp[‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½i 2003-04-04‚àŽQÆjB‚È‚©‚È‚©ƒjƒ…[ƒgƒ‰ƒ‹‚É‹Lq‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚Ü‚½A¡ŒŽ‚ÌCompeting Ideas‚ÍCost Allocation‚ÉŠÖ‚µ‚ĂŁAABC–@“™‚ªŠÈŒ‰‚É‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-05-20

NTL‚ªBT/BSkyB‚Ìbroadband promotion‚ð‘i‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚½ƒP[ƒX‚ɂ‚¢‚āADirector General of Telecommunications‚æ‚è‹p‰º‚Ì”»’f‚ª‰º‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚È‚©‚È‚©‹»–¡[‚¢“à—e‚Å‚·B

2003-05-19

‚Ç‚¿‚ç‚à“r’†Œo‰ßA‚Æ‚¢‚¤ˆÊ’u•t‚¯‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªABBC‚ªBSkyB‚ÌEPGECAS‚Ƃ̐ڑ±ðŒ‚ð‚ß‚®‚Á‚Ä‘ˆ‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚錏‚ÆHughes(GE)/Newscorp‚̍‡•¹ƒP[ƒX‚Ì‘o•û‚ɂ‚¢‚āAƒIƒtƒBƒVƒƒƒ‹‚È“®‚«‚ªo‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-05-12

FCC‚ªŒ©’¼‚µ‚ði‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚é•ú‘—‹Ç‚̏Š—L‹K§‚ɂ‚¢‚ẮA35%‚©‚ç45%‚ւ̈ø‚«ã‚°‚Ì’ñˆÄ‚ªo‚³‚êA6ŒŽ2“ú‚ɍ̌ˆ‚ɂȂ錩ž‚Ý‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·B

2003-04-25

‚Ç‚¤‚â‚çECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚́AƒhƒCƒc–¯•úEƒeƒŒƒRƒ€˜A–¿VPRT‚ªAƒhƒCƒc­•{‚ªŒö‹¤•ú‘—ƒT[ƒrƒX‚Ə¤‹ÆƒT[ƒrƒX‚̉ïŒv•ª—£‚ð’è‚ß‚½transparency directive‚ɏ]‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚È‚¢‚±‚ƁA‚»‚µ‚ÄŒö‹¤•ú‘—ARD‹y‚ÑZDF‚ðcross-subsidisation‚ɖ₤‚½Œ‚ɂ‚¢‚ĐR‹c‚ðŠJŽn‚·‚é–Í—l‚Å‚·iŠÖ˜AƒvƒŒƒXƒŠƒŠ[ƒX‚àƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½ 2003-04-24jB

‚ ‚ƁAƒRƒiƒ~“™ŒxŽ–Œ‚ÌŠÖ˜AŽ‘—¿‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-04-17

’x‚ê‚΂¹‚È‚ª‚çA 2003-04-04‚ÉAOL/Time Warner‚ªInstant Messaging‚ɂ‚¢‚臕¹Žž‚ɉۂ³‚ꂽðŒ‚Ì‰ðœ‚ð‹‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚éŠÖ˜A‚̃Šƒ“ƒN‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-04-14

ƒƒjƒ…[‚©‚çyŒ¤‹†•ñ‘“™z‚ð—Ž‚Æ‚µAƒwƒbƒhƒ‰ƒCƒ“‚Ɉê–{‰»‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BEU‚̃TƒCƒg‚ª[–鎞ŠÔƒ_ƒEƒ“‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚é‚炵‚­AXVŽžŠú‚ª‚¸‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

2003-04-04

EC Competition Law‚É‚¨‚¯‚éServices of General Interest‚̈µ‚¢‚ɂ‚¢‚āA‰Ä‚ÉGreen Paper‚ªo‚é‚Æ‚¢‚¤ŠÏ‘ª‹LŽ–‚ðˆÈ‘O‘‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA“à—e‚ª­‚µ‚¸‚ƒŠ[ƒN‚³‚ê‚Ä‚«‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·B“–‰‚Í‘Š“–Œµ‚µ‚­‚È‚é‚̂ł́H‚Æ‚¢‚¤Œ©•û‚ª‘½‚©‚Á‚½‚Å‚·‚ªAEnlargement‚É”º‚¤Ž·s—͒ቺ‚àl‚¦‚āAŒã‘Þ‚·‚é‚Ì‚Å‚Í‚È‚¢‚©‚Æ‚Ì—\‘ª‚à¬‚¶‚è‚Í‚¶‚ß‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-04-03

Newscorp/Telepiù‚̍‡•¹‚ªðŒ•t”F‰Â‚Æ‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½BMontiŽ‚àu–ž‘«‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚év‚Ƃ̃Rƒƒ“ƒg‚ð•t‚¯‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‚Ü‚³‚É‹³‰È‘’Ê‚è‚Ì”»’f‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BPublic text‚ð‘Ò‚Á‚āA‚©‚‚ĂÌBertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere‚âBiB/OpenA‚»‚µ‚Ä‚±‚̉Ă©‚ç‚ÌTelecom Package“™‚Æ—‚ß‚È‚ª‚çAƒ[ƒLƒ“ƒOƒy[ƒp[‚É‚·‚é‚‚à‚è‚Å‚·B

2003-03-28

¡ŒŽ‚ÌCompeting Ideas‚ÍStandardisation‚Å‚µ‚½BNew Telecom Package‚à‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚µAEU–@‚́fInternal Marketf‚ÌŽ‹“_‚©‚ç‚àAd—v‚ȃe[ƒ}‚¾‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·B

‚Ü‚½11“ú‚ÉCCs‚«‚ªŒˆ’肳‚ꂽACarlton/Granada‚̃P[ƒX‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éOFT‚̈ӌ©‚ªŒöŠJ‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-03-27

‚Ü‚½ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚©‚çA‹»–¡[‚¢ˆÏ‘õŒ¤‹†‘‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½BVƒRƒ~ƒ…ƒjƒP[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“Žw—ߌQ‰º‚Ì•ú‘—‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éfgeneral interestf‚ªƒe[ƒ}‚ŁAmust-carry obligations, spectrum policy, conditional access‚ɂ‚¢‚Ĉµ‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-03-20 (up at 03-22)

‚Æ‚¤‚Æ‚¤Žn‚Ü‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B]ŒRA‚Ü‚½Žü•Ó‚É‚¢‚é’ml‚ª‚¢‚Ü‚·‚̂ŁA‚Ü‚¸‚Í‚»‚̈À‘S‚ð‹F‚肽‚¢‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

17“ú‚Ì‚Æ‚±‚ë‚ɁAƒˆ[ƒƒbƒp‚̉f‰æŽY‹Æ‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éŒoÏ•ªÍƒŒƒ|[ƒg‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ä‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·BƒAƒƒŠƒJ‚̉f‰æŽY‹Æ‚Æ‚Ì”äŠr‚ŏ‘‚©‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚èA‚Æ‚Ä‚à‘å‚«‚ȈႢ‚ª‚ ‚邱‚Æ‚ª•ª‚©‚è‚Ü‚·B

2003-03-17

T––AOz ShyŽ‚́fA quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costsfiInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(2002)j‚ð“Ç‚Ý‚È‚ª‚çA‰¢B‚Å‚Ì‚¢‚­‚‚©‚Ì‹£‘ˆ–@‚̃P[ƒX‚É“–‚Ä‚Í‚ß‚ð‚µ‚Ä‚Ý‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚±‚¤‚¢‚Á‚½‚¨—V‚сH‚́A’m“IDŠïS‚ð‚­‚·‚®‚è‚Ü‚·B

2003-03-14

‹vX‚ÉEC‹£‘ˆ–@specific‚̕׋­‚É–ß‚èAVickersŽ‚́fCompetition Economics and PolicyfiECLR 2003, 24(3)j‚ð“Ç‚Ý‚Ü‚µ‚½BƒAƒƒŠƒJ‚É‚¨‚¯‚锽ƒgƒ‰ƒXƒg–@‚Ö‚ÌŒoÏ—˜_‚̉ž—p‚Ì—ðŽj‚ɐG‚ê‚È‚ª‚çAŽ˜_‚ÌSLC testADominance test‚Ì”äŠr‚âA‰p‘‚É‚¨‚¯‚éNew Enterprise Bill‚É‚æ‚éŠT”OE§“x•ÏX‚ɂ‚¢‚Äà–¾‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚ ‚Á‚³‚è‚Æ‚µ‚½ƒy[ƒp[‚Å‚·‚ªA‚¢‚ë‚¢‚ëŽv‚¢o‚·‚æ‚·‚ª‚Æ‚È‚èAƒŠƒnƒrƒŠ‚É‚Í‚¿‚傤‚Ç—Ç‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Å‚µ‚½B

2003-03-13

‰pCommunications BillR‹c‚ւ̃vƒŒƒbƒVƒƒ[A‚ÆŒ¾‚Á‚Ä—Ç‚¢‚ÆŽv‚¤‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªABBC‚ÌŒˆˆÓ‚ªŠ´‚¶‚ç‚ê‚Ü‚·B

2003-03-10

 gTelevision without Frontiersh DirectiveŒ©’¼‚µ‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚épublic consultation‚Ì‚¨‚µ‚点‚ªo‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·Bæ”Ê—ˆ“ú‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚½DG INFSO‚ÌPeter ScotŽiNew Telecom Package’S“–j‚àq‚ׂĂ¢‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA¡Œã‚́g•ú‘—h‚Ì‚ ‚è•û‚ð‚ß‚®‚é‹c˜_‚ª—lXo‚Ä‚­‚é‚à‚Ì‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-02-21

ˆÏˆõ‰ï“à‚Ì‚²‚½‚²‚½‚àŠÜ‚ߊ֐S‚ðW‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚½FCC‚̃Aƒ“ƒoƒ“ƒhƒ‹ƒ‹[ƒ‹‰ü³‚ªs‚í‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B—lX‚È•]‰¿‚ªo—ˆ‚悤‚©‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-02-19

¡Ž‚ÌCompeting Ideas‚́A¡ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚Å‚àŒŸ“¢‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚éAState Aid‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŒoÏ•ªÍ‚Ì—˜—p‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Å‚·iyPersonal Archivesz‚Ƀwƒbƒhƒ‰ƒCƒ“‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·jB

2003-02-17

EU–@ ‚̕׋­‚ði‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚­‚È‚©‚ŁA‹£‘ˆ–@ˆÈŠO•ª–ì‚É‚¨‚¢‚āAŽsê‰æ’è‚Æ‚¢‚¢‚Ü‚·‚©Across-elasticity‚âproduct substitutability‚É’…–Ú‚·‚éŒÂŠ‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½‚̂ŁAŽQl‚Ü‚ÅŒf‚°‚Ä‚¨‚«‚Ü‚·B“¯Ží‚̐»•i‚ɈقȂéÅ‚̐ݒè‚ð‹Ö‚¶‚éArticle 90(1) EC‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é‚à‚̂ŁAƒP[ƒX‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‚ÍCase 170/78, Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 2265“™‚ª‚ ‚èA'similarity'“x‚𑪂éÛ‚É—p‚¢‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-02-12

ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚æ‚èAnew regulatory framework for electronic communications‚̍Ōã‚̃p[ƒcAŽ–‘O‹K§Žsê‚̉æ’è‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éRecommendation‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B“¯Žž‚ɏo‚½—lX‚ÈŽwjEƒXƒs[ƒ`‚Æ‚Æ‚à‚ɁAƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚·B

2003-02-12

‰pCommunications Bill‚ɂ܂‚í‚é‚¢‚­‚‚©‚Ì‹^–â“_‚ɂ‚¢‚āAJowellŽ‚ªƒXƒs[ƒ`‚É‚Ä“š‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‘¼•ûALabour Party‚ÌMP‚Í“¯‚¶˜_“_‚ɂ‚¢‚āAC³—v‹‚ð‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚­‚悤‚Å‚·B

2003-02-05

–ß‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½Bƒj[ƒXð–ñ‚ª”­Œø‚µ‚½‚èAECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚Ì'golden share'ƒ‹[ƒ‹‚ɑ΂µ‚Ä‚ÌŒ©‰ð‚ªo‚½‚è‚ƁiƒCƒ‰ƒNUŒ‚‚ª–³‚©‚Á‚½‚Ì‚Í—\‘zŠOH‚Å‚µ‚½‚ªj‚¢‚ë‚¢‚ë‚ ‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½BƒqƒAƒŠƒ“ƒO“™‚̐¬‰Ê‚àŠÜ‚߁A‘‚߂ɃtƒHƒ[o—ˆ‚ê‚΂Ǝv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-01-22

ƒfƒ“ƒ}[ƒN‚ÌTV2‚ÉŠÖ‚µ‚āAState Aid‚̐R¸‚ªŽn‚Ü‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½BŽ„‚Ì’m‚éŒÀ‚èACommunication”­sˆÈŒã‚̏‰‚̃P[ƒX‚ŁA³Šm‚ɉˆ‚Á‚½ƒvƒŒƒXƒŠƒŠ[ƒX‚ªo‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

¡ŒŽ‚ÌCompeting Ideas‚́Að”N––o‚³‚ꂽOFT‚ÌBskyB‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚錈’è‚̉ðà‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·iyPersonal Archivesz‚Ƀwƒbƒhƒ‰ƒCƒ“jB

2003-01-24

‚ ‚·‚©‚ç10“ú‚Ù‚Ç“ú–{‚𗣂ê‚邽‚߁AƒTƒCƒg‚̍XV‚ªƒXƒgƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚·BŽŸ‰ñXV‚Í2ŒŽ5“ú‚Ì—\’è‚Å‚·iæ‚Ƀ^ƒCƒgƒ‹ƒoƒi[‚¾‚¯•Ï‚¦‚Ü‚µ‚½jB\‚µ–ó‚ ‚è‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ªA‚Ç‚¤‚¼‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

‚È‚¨A‚¨‹}‚¬‚Ì•û‚́AuŽ„‚̉º‚Ì–¼‘O‚̃[ƒ}Žš•\‹Lv0905@aol.com‚Öƒ[ƒ‹‚𒸂¯‚ê‚΂Ǝv‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-01-21

European Law Review‚ÅBBC News24‚ð‘Ώۂɏ‘‚¢‚Ä‚¢‚é‚à‚Ì‚ðŒ©‚Â‚¯‚Ü‚µ‚½iAntonio F. Bavasso, ePublic Service Broadcasting and State Aid Rules; Between a Rock and Hard Placef, ELRev, 2002, 27(3), 340-350jB‚Ù‚ÚŽ„‚ÌWorking Paper‚Æ“¯‚¶Ž‹Šp‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-01-17

kÐ‚©‚ç‚W”NBŽš‚ŏ‘‚­‚ƁA‚»‚ÌŽž‚Ì’·‚³‚ð‚ ‚ç‚½‚ß‚ÄŠ´‚¶‚Ü‚·B

ITC‚ÌProgramme Market Review‚ɑ΂µ‚Ä‚ÌDCMSŒ©‰ð‚ªo‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·Bð“ú‚æ‚èƒAƒbƒv‚ðŽn߂Ă¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‚³‚ç‚ɃXƒs[ƒ`ƒhƒ‰ƒtƒgAITC‚Ì”½‰ž‚ª’ljÁ‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-01-16

Eldred v AshcroftAŒ´”s‘i‚Æ‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-01-15

‚±‚»‚Á‚ÆTPS v Canal+‚ɂ‚¢‚ÄŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½i 2003-01-09j‚ªA‰f‰æ•ú‘—Œ ‚Ìduration, exclusivity, contract terms‚ð‚ß‚®‚èƒuƒ‰ƒbƒZƒ‹‚ª“®‚«o‚µ‚½‚Æ•ñ‚¶‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BŒÃ“TƒP[ƒX‚ÌARD Network‚ɂ‚¢‚čð”Nƒƒ‚‚É‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAˆÓŠO‚ÆŠˆ–ô‚·‚éê–Ê‚ªo‚Ä‚­‚é‚Ì‚©‚à‚µ‚ê‚Ü‚¹‚ñB

‚Ü‚½ATetra Laval/Sidel‚ɂ‚¢‚āAECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚Ì”»’fŒ©’¼‚µ‚ªs‚í‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B

‰Á‚¦‚ÄState Aid‚Ì’è‹`“™‚ð„‚Á‚Ä”»’f‚ª‘Ò‚½‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½Altmark‚̃P[ƒX‚ɂ‚¢‚āAÄ“xAG‚æ‚èOpinion‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B”ñí‚ɏd—v‚Ȉȏ‚Ȃ̂ŁAexceptional procedure‚ðŽæ‚é‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·BˆÓŒ©‚»‚Ì‚à‚̂́AFerring‚Ì”»—á•ÏX‚ð–]ޗL—͐à‚Ì—¬‚ê‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2003-01-10

—lX‚È‚à‚Ì‚ªƒAƒbƒv‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚è‚Ü‚·B‚Ü‚¸AEC‹£‘ˆ–@ŠÖŒW‚ł́AƒƒfƒBƒA‹ÆŠE‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŽsê‰æ’è‚ɂ‚¢‚āABird&Bird‚ƁAEurope Economics‚É‚æ‚郊ƒT[ƒ`ƒy[ƒp[‚ªo‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ç‚¿‚ç‚à“Ç‚Ýž‚¦‚Ì‚ ‚è‰ß‚¬‚镪—Ê‚Å‚·‚ªA‚´‚Á‚Æ“Ç‚ñ‚¾‚Æ‚±‚ëA‚È‚©‚È‚©‹»–¡[‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Å‚µ‚½B

‚Ü‚½A•ñ“¹‚ª‚È‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½’Ê‚èACarnival/P&O Princess‚̍‡•¹R¸‚ªÄ“xs‚í‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B

Šô“x‚Æ‚È‚­R¸ŠúŒÀ‚ª‰„‚΂³‚ê‚Ä‚«‚½BBC‚ÌDigital Curriculum‚ɂ‚¢‚āA18ðŒ‚ª•t‚³‚ꂽ‚¤‚¦‚ŁA”F‰Â‚ª‰º‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2003-01-06

’x‚ê‚΂¹‚È‚ª‚çA–¾‚¯‚Ü‚µ‚Ä‚¨‚ß‚Å‚Æ‚¤‚²‚´‚¢‚Ü‚·B¡”N‚à‚æ‚낵‚­‚¨Šè‚¢’v‚µ‚Ü‚·B

‚³‚āA‹x‚Ý’†‚ÍInformation GoodsŠÖ˜A‚ÌŒoÏŠwƒy[ƒp[‚ð“Ç‚Ý‚Ü‚­‚é‚Æ‚Æ‚à‚ɁA‘åŠw‰@‚̃AƒTƒCƒ“ƒƒ“ƒg‚ð‚܂Ƃ߂邽‚߁AŒ´ŽnEC–@‚Æ'Judicial Activism'‚ɂ‚¢‚ÄŠw‚ñ‚Å‚¨‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B

‘OŽÒ‚ɂ‚¢‚ẮAŠÔ‚à‚È‚­i‚ ‚é‚¢‚Í‚à‚¤Hj‹£‘ˆ–@‚̐¢ŠE‚Å‚à³–Ê‚©‚ç‹c˜_‚³‚ê‚é‚Å‚µ‚傤‚©‚çi‚Ü‚¾AAccess Pricing‚Ç‚Ü‚è‚Å‚·‚à‚̂ˁjA¡”N‚̉ۑè‚Æ‚µ‚āA‰½‚Æ‚©ƒy[ƒp[‚Ü‚ÅŽ‚Á‚čs‚«‚½‚¢‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BŒãŽÒ‚ɂ‚¢‚ẮAŠÔ‚à‚È‚­ƒAƒbƒv‚·‚é—\’è‚Å‚·B

2002-12-27

ƒTƒCƒg‚𗧂¿ã‚°‚Ä”¼”NA­‚È‚­‚Æ‚àŽ©‚ç‚ÌŠwK‚ɂ͖𗧂‚悤‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ü‚¾‚Ü‚¾“à—e‚Ì”–‚¢ƒTƒCƒg‚Å‚·‚ªA¡Œã‚Æ‚à‚æ‚낵‚­‚¨Šè‚¢’v‚µ‚Ü‚·B‚È‚¨AXV‚Í—ï’Ê‚è‚ŁAŽŸ‰ñƒAƒbƒv‚Í1ŒŽ6“ú‚Ì—\’è‚Å‚·B

2002-12-24

‚¿‚å‚Á‚Æ’x‚­‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA2002-12-17‚ÉE.ON/Rurhgas‚ÌDüsseldorf ”»Œˆ‚ɂ‚¢‚ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚±‚ê‚Í’·Šúí‚É‚È‚è‚»‚¤‚Å‚·‚ˁB

‚½‚Ü‚½‚ÜARD Network‚Æ‚¢‚¤•ú‘—Œ ‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éŒÃ“TƒP[ƒX‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ìworking paper‚ð‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚½‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªyPersonal ArchiveszAPremier League‚ɂ‚¢‚Ă̐R—‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚àA‰½‚©Ž‹Šp‚ð’ñ‹Ÿ‚µ‚Ä‚­‚ê‚»‚¤‚Å‚·B

2002-12-20

ˆÈ‘O‚̃y[ƒp[‚ŐG‚ê‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½AState Aid‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚ÌDiscussion Paper‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½i2002-12-13 INFOŽQÆjB‚Ü‚½ACompeting Ideas‚ª“Í‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½‚̂ŁAyPersonal Archivesz‚ɃgƒsƒbƒNƒX‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-12-19

17“ú‚ÉŒf‚°‚½ECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚̃Xƒs[ƒ`‚ɂ‚«A‚æ‚èÚ×‚ȃo[ƒWƒ‡ƒ“‚ð‚²–{l‚æ‚苳‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚½‚¾‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½‚̂ŁA‚ ‚킹‚ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-12-18

’·‚ç‚­‰Û‘è‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚½BskyB‚̃P[X‚ɂ‚¢‚āAOFT‚Ì”»’f‚ª‰º‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-12-13

State Aid‚ÆSGEIs‚ɂ‚¢‚āAECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚æ‚èstate of play‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚µ‚©‚µAƒƒ“ƒhƒ“‚Å‚àŽv‚Á‚½‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAState Aid‚Á‚Ä‚ ‚Ü‚èl‹C‚Ì‚È‚¢Œ¤‹†•ª–ì‚̂悤‚Å‚·‚ˁBŒoÏŠw‚Æ‹£‘ˆ–@‚̐؂茋‚ԋǖʁA‚Æ‚¢‚¤ˆÓ–¡‚ł́A‚È‚©‚È‚©‹»–¡[‚¢‚ÆŽv‚¤‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªB

2002-12-09

EU–@ŠwK‚̐®—‚Ì‚½‚߁APersonal Archives‚ÉWorking Paper…€‚É‚ÍŽŠ‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚È‚¢ƒƒ‚‚ð‚‚¬‚‚¬remainder‚Æ‚µ‚ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ä‚¨‚è‚Ü‚·B‚Ç‚¤‚¼‚¨‹C‚É‚È‚³‚¢‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚悤B

æ“úi 2002-11-20j‘‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA‰pCommunications Bill‚́fmust-carry/must-offerf‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚鍡Œã‚̏C³‚ð‚ß‚®‚èAƒLƒƒƒŠƒA[‚Å‚ ‚éBskyB‚Ì”½˜_‚ª‹­‚­‚È‚Á‚Ä‚«‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·BŽQl‚܂ŁAJoint Committee‚ōs‚í‚ꂽ‹c˜_‚ɂ‚¢‚ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚·i‚‚¢‚łɁA‹£‘ˆ–@‚ɂ‚¢‚ājB

2002-12-02

provisional deadline‚ð‚Þ‚©‚¦‚½Telepiu‚̃P[ƒXi 2002-10-16j‚́AR¸ŽžŠÔ•s\•ª‚Æ‚¢‚¤‚±‚ƂŁAPhase II‚É“ü‚Á‚½‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·B

‚Ü‚½ACFI‚É‚ÄECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚̍‡•¹–³ŒøŒˆ’肪•¢‚³‚ꂽSchneider/Legrand‚̃P[ƒXi 2002-10-22j‚ÉŠÖ˜A‚µ‚Ä‚Å‚·‚ªA•§Versailles appeals court‚ª29“úASchneider‚ªdivestiture‚Æ‚µ‚ÄECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚É’ñŽ¦‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚½disposal plan‚ðˆá–@‚Æ‚·‚鉺‹‰R”»Œˆ‚ðŽxŽ‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½iLegrand‚ÌŒ³Š—LŽÒ‚É‚æ‚é’ñ‘ijB

2002-11-29

ð“ú‚̃ŒƒbƒVƒO‹³Žö‚̍u‰‰‚Å‚Í‚¶‚ß‚Ä’m‚Á‚½‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAƒ|ƒYƒi[‚àƒŒƒbƒVƒO‚ç‚Æ“¯—lASonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act‚É”½‘΂̗§ê‚ð•\–¾‚µ‚½‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·Bi‘S•¶ [Eldred v. AshcroftƒTƒCƒg‚æ‚è]j

‚Ü‚½A11ŒŽ8“úE9ŒŽ20“ú‚ÌPhilip LOWE‚̃Xƒs[ƒ`‚ªƒAƒbƒv‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚µ‚½‚̂ŁA‚»‚ꂼ‚ê‚Ì“ú•t‚ɉÁ‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-11-27

Antitrust reform‚́A—\’è’Ê‚èCouncil‚É‚ÄÌ‘ð‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½iƒƒ‚jB“d‹CEƒKƒX‚ÌŽ©—R‰»ŠÖ˜A‚ÌŽ‘—¿‚Æ‚Æ‚à‚ÉŒf‚°‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-11-25

Mario MontiŽ‚̃Xƒs[ƒ`‚ɂāARegulation No.17iImplementation of Articles 81 and 82j‹y‚ÑRegulation 4064/89iMerger Controlj‚̉ü³‚ɂ‚¢‚ďڂ炩‚ÉŒê‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B[Œp‘±ƒgƒsƒbƒNƒX]‚àŠÜ‚߁AƒAƒbƒvƒf[ƒg‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½iŒãŽÒ‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚郁ƒ‚jB

2002-11-21

‰pITC‚æ‚èo‚³‚ꂽfFuture Reflectionsf‚́A’P‚È‚é“Ç‚Ý•¨‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‚à‚È‚©‚È‚©–Ê”’‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Å‚·B

2002-11-20

Communications Bill‚ª”­•\‚³‚ê‚Ü‚µ‚½BBBC‚̃vƒŒƒXƒŠƒŠ[ƒX‚É‚àŒ¾‹y‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAEC Telecom Package‚Å‚¢‚¤‚Æ‚±‚ë‚Ìelectronic communications‘S”Ê‚É‚©‚©‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚½must-carry‹K’肪C³‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚èA‹t‚ÉŒö‹¤•ú‘—Ž–‹ÆŽÒ‚Ìmust-offer‹K’肪Ú‚µ‚­‘‚«ž‚Ü‚ê‚邱‚ƂŁAŒ»s—Bˆê‚ÌDigital SatelliteABSkyB‚É‚Í’¼Ú“K—p‚³‚ê‚È‚¢‚悤‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BDCMS‚Ìà–¾‚́AEC directive‚É‚ ‚éfon a fair and non-discriminatory basisf‚ł̐ڑ±‚ª’S•Û‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚©‚Ç‚¤‚©A‚Æ‚¢‚¤]—ˆ‚ÌOftel‚ÌŒ©‰ð‚Æ“¯‚¶‚Å‚ ‚èA‚±‚ê‚ðŽó‚¯‚āi‚Æ‚Í’m‚ç‚È‚©‚Á‚½‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªjAOftelƒ}ƒ^[‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚½BSkyB‚Ƃ́gÚ‘±—¿h‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚àŠÔ‚à‚È‚­Œˆ’…‚·‚錩’Ê‚µ‚Å‚·B

2002-11-07

‘åŠw‚ŏЉ‚Ä‚à‚ç‚Á‚½‚à‚Ì‚È‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAWeber ShandwickŽÐ‚ÌInteractive Guide to the EU‚Í‚È‚©‚È‚©Šy‚µ‚­A‚©‚‚½‚ß‚É‚È‚éƒKƒCƒh‚Å‚·B

2002-11-01

FCC‚É‘±‚«ADOJ‚æ‚èDirecTV/Echostar‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ì”»’f‚ª‰º‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‚Ü‚½‚Ü‚¾[‚­‚Í“Ç‚ñ‚Å‚¢‚È‚¢‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAITC‚̃Œƒ|[ƒg‚à–Ê”’‚»‚¤‚Å‚·B

2002-10-30

US-EU Merger Working Group‚̐¬‰Ê‚Æ‚µ‚āABest Practice on Cooperation in Merger Investigation‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½B—ˆ”N‚ɂ́AŒœˆÄ‚Ìoligopolistic market‚É‚¨‚¯‚écompetitive effects‚ÆŒø—¦«‚Ì•]‰¿‚ɏœ_‚ð‚ ‚Ä‚ÄŒŸ“¢‚ðs‚¤‚悤‚Å‚·B

2002-10-28

‰¢B‚Ì•ñ“¹‚ðŒ©‚Ü‚·‚ƁA‰º‹L‚Ì”»Œˆ“™‚ðŽó‚¯‚āAMario MontiŽ‚©‚ç‚Í‚©‚È‚èƒhƒ‰ƒXƒeƒBƒbƒN‚ȉüŠv’ñˆÄ‚ªo‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·B¡“xAƒuƒ‰ƒbƒZƒ‹‚Ì—Fl‚É•·‚¢‚Ă݂悤‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-10-22

’–Ú‚ÌCFI”»Œˆ‚́A‚â‚Í‚è–³Œø‚Æ‚¢‚¤Œ‹‰Ê‚Æ‚È‚Á‚½‚悤‚Å‚·i25“ú‚Ì”»Œˆ‚à‘±‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½jB

2002-10-21

ƒAƒCƒ‹ƒ‰ƒ“ƒh‚̃j[ƒXð–ñ”áy‚ªŒˆ‚Ü‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚²ŽQl‚܂ŁAƒAƒCƒ‹ƒ‰ƒ“ƒh‚Ì—Fl‚©‚ç‚à‚ç‚Á‚½‚t‚q‚k‚Å‚·BcÌ‚ÌŽ‘—¿‚ðŽ‚Á‚Ä‚«‚āA•ÏX“_‚ðƒ`ƒFƒbƒN‚µŽn‚ß‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·[Summary of the Treaty of Nice](.pdf-file)B

Šw¶g•ª‚ð‚à‚ç‚Á‚Ä“ñ‘«‚Ì‚í‚炶¶Šˆ‚ªŽn‚Ü‚Á‚½‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAWestlaw‚È‚Ç‚Ì—L—¿ƒf[ƒ^ƒx[ƒX‚ւ̃AƒNƒZƒX‚ª‰Â”\‚É‚È‚èA”ñí‚ɏd•ó‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·i‰½‚Å‚àŒ©‚‚©‚Á‚Ä‚µ‚Ü‚Á‚Ä‹t‚É“ï‹V‚à‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªjBDistance Learning‚Æon campus‚̃CƒR[ƒ‹EƒtƒbƒeƒBƒ“ƒO‚́AŽv‚¢‚Ì‚Ù‚©Šm•Û‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·B

yƒ‰ƒCƒuƒ‰ƒŠ[z‚ɐVŠ§‚ÌŒoÏ–@uÀ‚Rû‚ð‰Á‚¦‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ü‚¾‚Ü‚¾–¡“Ç’†‚Å‚·‚ªAìà_˜_•¶Aò…˜_•¶‚Ù‚©”ñí‚ɕ׋­‚É‚È‚é‚à‚̂΂©‚è‚Å‚·B

2002-10-18

–ß‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B’Z‚¢ŠÔ‚Å‚µ‚½‚ªA‚¢‚ë‚¢‚ë‚ ‚Á‚½‚悤‚Å‚·‚ˁB‚¿‚å‚Á‚ƃAƒbƒvƒf[ƒg‚É‚ÍŽžŠÔ‚ª‚©‚©‚è‚»‚¤‚Å‚·i‚Æ‚è‚ ‚¦‚¸Aremainder—p‚É‚ ‚¿‚ç‚сƒ‚‚Á‚½ƒwƒbƒ_[‚¾‚¯æs‚µ‚ÄŒf‚°‚Ü‚·jB

Competing Ideas‚̐V†‚ɂ‚¢‚āA‚Ü‚½yPersonal Archivesz‚ɏ‘‚«‰Á‚¦‚Ü‚µ‚½B‚Ç‚¤‚àæŽèæŽè‚Ńe[ƒ}‚ð‘I‚΂ê‚Ä‚µ‚Ü‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·cŠwK‚Ì•ûŒü«‚̐³‚µ‚³‚ÌŠm”F‚É‚Í‚È‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªB

2002-10-09

‚ ‚·‚æ‚èˆêTŠÔ‚Ù‚Ç“ú–{‚𗣂ê‚邽‚߁AƒTƒCƒgXV‚ªo—ˆ‚Ü‚¹‚ñB‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢i–ß‚Á‚Ä—ˆ‚Ä‚©‚çA‚¿‚á‚ñ‚Æ’Ç‚¢•t‚¯‚é‚©IHjB

European Parliament‚ÌSecond Reading‚܂ʼnñ‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚éhMarket Abuse Directiveh‚ɂ‚¢‚āAƒvƒŒƒX‚Æ‚ÌŠÖŒW‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ì‹c˜_‚ªŽûÊ‚³‚ê‚Ä‚«‚½‚悤‚Å‚·‚̂ŁAŠÖ˜A•¶‘‚àŠÜ‚ß‚Ä 2002-10-07‚É‚Ü‚Æ߂Čf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-10-08

‚«‚傤AEurovision‚̃P[ƒX‚ÌCFI”»Œˆ‚ªo‚é‚悤‚Å‚·co‚Ü‚µ‚½BƒTƒuƒ‰ƒCƒZƒ“ƒXƒ‹[ƒ‹‚Ì‚Ý‚Å‚È‚­A–{ƒ‹[ƒ‹‘S‘̂ɂ‚¢‚Ä‹£‘ˆ§ŒÀ“I‚Æ‚Ì”»’f‚̂悤‚Å‚·B

ƒuƒ‰ƒbƒZƒ‹‚Ì”»’f‘Ò‚¿‚Æ‚È‚éTelepiu/ Telecom Italia&News Television‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä’²‚ׂ悤‚Æ‚µ‚āAŠÖ˜AŽ‘—¿‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ–Y‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚½‚±‚Æ‚É‹C‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½B

c‚Æ‚¢‚¤–ó‚ŁA 2002-06-30 Stream/Telecom Italia&News Television [EC], 2002-05-13 Stream/Canal+&Telepiu [AGCM]‚ðŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½B

DOJAFCC‚Æ‚àEchostar/DirecTV‚ɂ͔ےè“I‚ÈŒ©•û‚̂悤‚Å‚·‚µAMurdochŽ‚Ì–¼‘O‚ªŽ†–Ê‚ð“ö‚í‚·“ú‚Í‘±‚«‚»‚¤‚Å‚·B

2002-10-07

FTC‚É‚æ‚éCarnival/PrincessARoyal Caribbean/Princess—¼ƒP[ƒX‚Ö‚Ì”»’f‚ªo‚Ü‚µ‚½c‚©‚‚ÄWorking Paper‚ð‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªA‰Á•M‚ª•K—v‚Å‚·‚ˁB‚ ‚̃y[ƒp[‚ÍAfter Airtours‚Ì•¶–¬‚ŏ‘‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAFTC‚Ì”»’f‚à‹Í·‚ŁA‚¶‚Á‚­‚è“Ç‚Þ‰¿’l‚ª‚ ‚è‚»‚¤‚Å‚·B

2002-10-04

‚¿‚å‚Á‚Æ’x‚­‚È‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAAudiovisulal‚ÌCommissioner, Viviane RedingŽ‚̃Xƒs[ƒ`‚ðŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½B—á‚É‚æ‚Á‚ătƒ‰ƒ“ƒXŒê‚Ì‚Ý‚Å‚µ‚½‚ªcH

VickersŽ‚́fCompetition economics and policyf‚́A‘Š•Ï‚í‚炸‚ÌŠÈŒ‰–¾—Ä‚³‚ŁA“Ç‚Ý‚â‚·‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

Šy‹È‚ÌŽg—pŒ ‚ð‚ß‚®‚Á‚āAƒJƒ‰ƒIƒP‰ïŽÐ‚ª—§‚¿“ü‚茟¸‚ðŽó‚¯‚½‚悤‚Å‚·Bu•sŒö³‚ÈŽæˆø•û–@v’ïG‚Ì‹^‚¢‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚µ‚½‚ªA‚ǂ̂悤‚ȃƒWƒbƒN‚È‚Ì‚©A‚Æ‚Ä‚àŠÖS‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B

2002-10-03

yPersonal Archivesz‚É”õ–Y˜^A˜_•¶‰»‚ÖŒü‚¯‚½ƒƒ‚‚Æ‚µ‚āAfMemorandum on E.ON casef‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½Bƒ‹£‘ˆ–@“I‚Å‚È‚¢Œ©•û‚ð‚µ‚Ä‚Ý‚½‚¢‚Æ‚¢‚¤—U˜f‚É‹ì‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-09-29

yƒ‰ƒCƒuƒ‰ƒŠ[zAyƒŠƒ“ƒNz‚ð‚»‚ê‚¼‚ꏭXŠg[‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

27“ú‚ÉEC CompetitionƒTƒCƒg‚ɃAƒbƒv‚³‚ꂽThe Economics of Antitrust in the Telecommunications Sector‚́A’˜–¼‚ÈŠwŽÒEŽÀ–±‰Æ‚̃hƒLƒ…ƒƒ“ƒgEƒvƒŒƒ[ƒ“ƒe[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“‚ª”‘½‚­‘µ‚¦‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚èA‚½‚ß‚É‚È‚é•û‚à‘½‚¢‚©‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-09-26

“ú–{‚Ì“Æ‹Ö–@‚É‚¨‚¢‚Ä‚àALeniency Policy“±“ü‚ªs‚í‚ê‚é‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚Å‚·Bð¡‚Ì“à•””­˜b‚ƃVƒ“ƒNƒ‚³‚¹‚ÄŒê‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‚Ç‚ñ‚È‚à‚Ì‚Å‚µ‚傤‚©B

25“ú‚ÉHouse Energy and Commerce Committee‚Ìsubcommittee‚ōs‚í‚ê‚éfRegarding the Transition to Digital Televisionf‚ɂ‚¢‚āANCTA‚Ìdraft testimony‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BØŒ¾‚Ì‚È‚©‚É‚à‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªADual Must Carry, Multiple Must Carry‚ɂ‚¢‚Ă͉ߋŽ‚̍ō‚Ù”»—á‚Æ‚àŠÖŒW‚µ‚ÄŒê‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¨‚èAƒƒfƒBƒA‚ÆŽY‹Æ­ô‚Ì‘ŠŽ‚ªŠ_ŠÔŒ©‚¦‚Ü‚·B

2002-09-25

CNN‚ÆABC‚̃jƒ…[ƒX•”–升•¹‚ÌŠÏ‘ª‚ªo‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·BƒP[ƒuƒ‹‚̐ê–åƒ`ƒƒƒ“ƒlƒ‹‚ÆŽl‘åƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒN‚̈êŠp‚Æ‚¢‚¤ˆÊ’uŠÖŒW‚Å‚·‚ªA—lX‚ÈŽ‹Šp‚©‚ç‚Ì•ªÍ‚ª‰Â”\‚ŁA”ñí‚É‹»–¡[‚­Œ©‚‚߂Ă¢Ü‚·B

2002-09-24@

‚²——‚̂悤‚ɁAƒXƒ^ƒCƒ‹‚ð­‚µ‚¾‚¯•ÏX‚µ‚‚‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·Bƒuƒ‰ƒEƒU‚É‚æ‚Á‚ÄTabˆÊ’u‚ª‹¶‚¤‚悤‚Ȃ̂ŁA‚»‚̏C³‚Å‚·B

E.ON‚̘b‚ª‚Ü‚Æ‚Ü‚Á‚½‚悤‚Å‚·‚ˁBˆêŽŸŽ‘—¿‚¾‚¯‚Å‚à‚܂Ƃ߂āAWorking Paper‚É‚Í‚µ‚悤‚©‚ÆŽv‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAŽžŠÔ‚ªc

Competing Ideas‚Ì9ŒŽ†‚ª“Í‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½ByPersonal Archivesz‚Ì––”ö‚É‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B‹£‘ˆ‚ª‚È‚º‰¶Œb‚ð‚à‚½‚ç‚·‚Ì‚©B”’l“I‚ÉŽ¦‚·‚Ì‚Í”ñí‚ɓ‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªAOFT‚̃fƒBƒXƒJƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“ƒy[ƒp[‚ðƒx[ƒX‚É‚æ‚­‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2002-09-20

Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy‚Æ‚¢‚¤•Ö—˜‚È‚à‚Ì‚ªEU/Competition siteƒAƒbƒv‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚µ‚½‚̂ŁAyƒŠƒ“ƒNz‚ÌEC•”•ª‚ɉÁ‚¦‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-09-19

ITC‚́fTelevision and Beyond: the next ten yearsf‚ðyŒ¤‹†•ñ‘“™z‚ɃAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BƒGƒbƒZ[“I‚Ș_lW‚Å‚·B

Headline‚ÉŒöŽæ‚ÌŒ¤‹†‰ï‚Ì‹cŽ–ŠT—v‚ð“ü‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‚±‚̈Ӑ}‚Í ‚Ì’Ê‚è‚Å‚·B

2002-09-13

H‚©‚ç‚ÌLL.MƒR[ƒX‚É”õ‚¦A‹£‘ˆ–@ˆÈŠO‚Ì•ª–ì‚̃ˆ[ƒƒbƒp–@ŠÖ˜A‚ÌŽ‘—¿®”õ‚ª‘‚¦‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BŽ×–‚‚È•û‚à‚¢‚ç‚Á‚µ‚á‚é‚ÆŽv‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA‘å‘O’ñ‚Æ‚È‚é•”•ª‚Å‚à‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚µA‚Ç‚¤‚¼‚²—eŽÍ‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

2002-09-11

ƒtƒ‰ƒ“ƒX‚ÌŠt—»‚½‚¿‚Ì‚È‚©‚ŁAVivendi Universal‚ðFrench‚̂܂܂ɁA‚Æ‚¢‚¤Žå’£‚ª‚È‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·BfFrench Exceptionalityf‚Ɛ킢‚ð•WžÔ‚µ‚½‚Ì‚ª“¯ŽÐ‚¾‚Á‚½–ó‚Å‚·‚ªA EconomistŽ‚ªBBC‚ðGuardian of Quality in Britain‚Æ•]‚·‚é‹LŽ–‚ðŒfÚ‚µ‚½‚Ì‚Æ–­‚ɃŠƒ“ƒN‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚āA‹»–¡[‚­‰f‚è‚Ü‚µ‚½B

 

2002-09-10@yŒ¤‹†•ñ‘“™z‚ɁAChristopher YooŽ‚́f Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economyf‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BYale Journal on Regulation (2002, winter)‚ÉŒfÚ—\’è‚Ì‚à‚̂̃hƒ‰ƒtƒg‚Å‚·B

2002-09-09@yƒ‰ƒCƒuƒ‰ƒŠ[z‚ÉŒ›–@‚ƃƒfƒBƒA‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚Ì–{‚ªã‚ª‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚È‚¢‚Ì‚Å‚·‚ªA‚±‚ê‚Í‚³‚Ú‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Æ‚¢‚¤‚Ì‚à‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAŽÀÛ‚Ì”»—áE‚»‚Ì•]ŽßA‚ ‚é‚¢‚̓lƒbƒgƒGƒRƒ“‚Ì–{‚ɈꕔG‚ê‚ç‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é“à—e‚ð’´‚¦‚é‚à‚Ì‚ðŒ©o‚¹‚È‚¢A‚Æ‚¢‚¤Ž„‚ÌŠ´Šo‚à‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B‚©‚Æ‚¢‚Á‚Ä‘S‚­G‚ê‚È‚¢‚Ì‚à‰½‚Ȃ̂ŁA‘ ‘‚ðŒ©•Ô‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚éÅ’†‚Å‚·B

2002-09-06@yƒ‰ƒCƒuƒ‰ƒŠ[z‚É‚àÐ‰î‚µ‚Ä‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAOz ShyŽ‚̃lƒbƒgƒGƒRƒ“‚Ì‹³‰È‘‚Í–M–󂪏o‚é‚悤‚Å‚·i‚«‚傤A–{l‚æ‚è•·‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½jB

 

2002-09-03@yŒ¤‹†•ñ‘“™z‚ɁAOftel‚̈ϑõŒ¤‹†APropelling the broadband bandwagon‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B                   

2002-09-03@ 2002-08-09‚ÉCATV‚ðŠÜ‚Þ’nãƒfƒWƒ^ƒ‹•ú‘—‚̐i“W‚ÉŒü‚¯‚Ä‚ÌPowellƒvƒ‰ƒ“‚ðŽ¦‚µ‚½AMarkey‹cˆõ‚ւ̃Œƒ^[‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-09-02@yƒ‰ƒCƒuƒ‰ƒŠ[z‚ðVÝ‚µAˆóÛ‚ÉŽc‚Á‚½–{‚ðŒf‚°‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B‹ï‘Ì“I‚ÈŠ´‘z‚Ȃǂ́AƒŠƒ“ƒNæ‚̃Aƒ}ƒ]ƒ“‚ɏ‘‚¢‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·BÅ‹ß‚́A—HŠwŒn‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä‚ÍWorking Paper‚ðƒEƒFƒu‚ɃAƒbƒv‚·‚é‚Ì‚ª’Ê—á‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¢‚āA‚»‚Ì’†‚©‚çƒsƒbƒNƒAƒbƒv‚³‚ꂽ‚à‚Ì‚ªƒWƒƒ[ƒiƒ‹‚ÉŒfÚ‚³‚ê‚éŽd‘g‚Ý‚È‚Ì‚¾‚»‚¤‚Å‚·‚ªA“Á‚ÉEcon‚̃y[ƒp[‚𒆐S‚ɁAŽÐ‰ï‰ÈŠwŒn‚à“¯‚¶‚悤‚È—¬‚ê‚̂悤‚Å‚·B‚½‚¾A‚â‚Í‚èŽè‚É‚Æ‚Á‚ÄŽš‚ðŒ©‚é‚͈̂ÀS‚µ‚Ü‚·iŒÃ‚¢‚Å‚µ‚傤‚©HjBo“TŒ³‚ð–Y‚ê‚Ä‚µ‚Ü‚¤ŠëŒ¯‚à­‚È‚¢‚Å‚·‚µ‚ˁiÎjB

2002-08-29@ 2002-08-29‚ÉDTI‚̃vƒŒƒXƒŠƒŠ[ƒXŒf‚°‚Ü‚µ‚½‚ªAEnterprise Bill“±“ü‚É”º‚¤A‰p‘‚Ì‹£‘ˆ–@Enforcement‚Ö‚ÌŽp¨‚́A‹»–¡[‚¢‚à‚Ì‚Å‚·B

2002-08-27@‰Ä‹x‚݂̏h‘è‚Æ‚µ‚āAyPersonal Archivesz‚ÉWorking PaperAfLeverage of Market Powerf‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½BˆÈ‘O‚Ì‚à‚Ì‚É‘S–Ê“I‚ÉŽè‚ð“ü‚ꂽ‚à‚Ì‚Å‚·B’P‚È‚éEssay‚Æ‚È‚Á‚Ä‚µ‚Ü‚¢A˜_“_‚ª‚ڂ₯‚Ä‚¨‚è‚Ü‚·‚ªAƒRƒƒ“ƒg‚È‚Ç’¸‚¯‚ê‚΍K‚¢‚Å‚·B

2002-08-26@ƒnƒCƒp[ƒŠƒ“ƒN“Á‹–‚ňê–ô–Ú‚ðˆø‚¢‚½ABT v. Prodigy‚ÌSummary Judgment‚ðƒAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-08-23@yPersonal Archivesz‚É“ü‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·‚ªA¡ŒŽ‚ÌCompeting Ideas‚̃e[ƒ}‚́fLeverage of Market Powerf‚Å‚·B

@@@@@@@@@Å‹ß‚悤‚â‚­AXXXIst Report on competition policy(2001)‚ð‚«‚¿‚ñ‚Æ“Ç‚ÝŽn‚߁A•K—v‚ÈŽ‘—¿‚ð•â‚¢‚‚‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·B

2002-08-16@Greg SidakŽ‚ÌFCC‚̃Aƒ“ƒoƒ“ƒhƒ‹‹K§Œ©’¼‚µ‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é˜_•¶‚𒸂¢‚½‚̂ŁA 2002-05-24‚É‚ ‚킹‚ăAƒbƒv‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½B

2002-08-15@Unitedq‹ó‚ªŒo‰cŠë‹@‚ɊׂÁ‚Ä‚¢‚é‚悤‚Å‚·BUnited/US Airways‚Æ‚¢‚¦‚ΗL–¼‚ȃP[ƒX‚Å‚·‚ªA‹£‘ˆ‚̃_ƒCƒiƒ~ƒbƒN‚³‚ðŠ´‚¶‚Ü‚·B

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yInstitutional Framework of EC and UK Competition Lawz

EC

Under EC Law Article 81-89, ECMR

European Commission@¨@Court of First Instance@¨@European Court of Justice

UK

Under Enterprise Act 2002 (will take effect in spring/summer 2003)

              OFT and sectoral regulators(including OFCOM) ¨ Competition Commission, Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) ¨ Court of Appeal@¨ House of Lords

Under Competition Act 1998

DGFT and sectoral regulators@¨@Competition Commission, Appeal Tribunals (CCAT)@¨@Court of Appeal@¨ House of Lords

Under Fair Trading Act 1973

              Reference by Secretary of State, DGFT or sectoral regulators@¨@Competition Commission, Reporting side                 

 

yConcepts of EU laws and related Jargonsz

acquis communautaire

Acte clair principle

Audi alteram partem

ceteris paribus

Estoppel

jus cogens

locus standi

Mutatis Mutandis

ne bis in idem

Schengen acquis

syllogism

 

yConcepts closely related to Competition Lawz

Abuse

gArticle [82] covers practices which are likely to affect the structure of a market where, as a direct result of the presence of the undertaking in question, competition has already been weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services based on traderfs performance, have the effect of hindering the maintenance or development of the level of competition still existing on the marketh

              (Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1 CMLR 282, para. 70)

              the concept of the abuse is an objective one, meaning that behaviour can be abusive even where the dominant undertaking had no intention of infringing Article 82

              exploitative abuse: rare

anti-competitive abuse: no distinction between direct and indirect effect, no causation (possible if no exercising or relying on market power), efficiency taken into account, possible to apply for forecast, neighbouring marketsc(Richard Whish, 4th Edition)

Bottleneck

              Essential Facility, Unique input to the production process that cannot be cheaply duplicated

              Competition in Telecommunications, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 2000

Bundling

Cellophane Fallacy (US v Dl Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1956) 351 US 377.)

              substitution inevitably results where the price test is applied to a market price that is already set at a monopoly level

Collective Dominance

              a position of economic strength held by a group of firms that enjoy to a significant degree a lack of competitive constraint

Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing Between Competitive Oligopolies in Merger Control, European Economics, Final Report for the European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, 2001

              tacit collusion

                             ex. three-condition approach in EC by CFI - Airtours (2002)

                                           1. transparency

                                           2. retaliation mechanism

                                           3 barriers to entry and buyer power

Collusion

              Collusion is an older term employed in both the legal and economic literatures to describe interdependent decision-making among the firms in a market.

Coordinated Effects

              Coordination

Contemporary economic understanding of coordination, based on game-theoretic models of repeated interaction, actively shows that higher-than-competitive pricing is plausible in many oligopolies, even if the firms do not reach an agreement on price

An economic term describing outcomes resulting from the repeated interaction among the firms in a market

Cross-elasticity of demand / supply

Cross-Subsidy

              Accounting cost allocation

              Managerial cost allocation

                             Company has an incentive to allocate real resources strategically, thus generating social waste

              To Prevent Cross-Subsidies:

                             Accounting separation

                             Benchmarking

                                           Comparison with the Price of Similar Equipment Sold by Nonaffiliated Manufacturers

                                           Comparison with the Price of the Same Equipment Sold to External Buyers

eFrom an economic point of view cross-subsidisation occurs where the earnings from a given service do not suffice to cover the incremental costs of providing that service and where there is another service or bundle of services the earnings from which exceed the stand-alone costs. The service for which revenue exceeds stand-alone cost is the source of the cross subsidy and the service in which revenue does not cover the incremental costs is its destination.f

Case COMP/35.141- Deutsche Post AG (2001/354/EC) para. 6

Deadweight welfare loss

Discriminatory Pricing

              ¨Price Discrimination

Dominance Test, Dominance (Dominant Position)

              EC Merger Regulationfs principle: now reviewed

              concentrations that create or strengthen such dominance should be declared incompatible with the common market (and therefore unlawful)

              North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging Toward What?, by William J. Kolasky, BIICL conference, 2002

              Definition of gdominanceh

              The ability to prevent competition and the ability to behave independently

              (Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429)

ga position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it [to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power] (Whish says, it is just descriptive) to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumersh

gSuch a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detrimenth

(Case 85/76 Hoffman-la Roche&Co AG v Commission Case [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, para.38, 39)

(Case 27/76 United Brands Co and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, para.65 [the same as Hoffman-la Roche case, para. 38])

 eSpecial responsibilityf

              (Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Indusrtie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1 CMLR 282, para.57)

              eSuper-Dominancef

Efficiency

Allocative Efficiency

              Productive Efficiency

              Dynamic Efficiency

              Transactional Efficiency

The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers

by William J. Kolasky and Andrew R. Dick, paper for the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, 2002

              Allocative Efficiency

              Static Technical Efficiency

              Dynamic Efficiency

              Technical Progressiveness

              The development of targets for consumer savings arising from competition policy, Economic Discussion Paper4, OFT, 2002

              by Stephen Davis and Adrian Majumdar

              Allocative Efficiency (Pareto Efficiency)

              Productive Efficiency

              Dynamic Efficiency

              Competition Law Fourth Edition by Richard Whish, Butterworths, 2001

Efficiency Defense

Entry and Exit

Equal access

Essential Facility (doctrine)

              the owner of an essential facility may have an incentive to monopolize complementary or downstream segments as well

              first discussed in US in Terminal Railroad Association v US (1912)

              Competition in Telecommunications, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 2000

Facilitating practices

              ex. gmost-favored-customerh provisions

hFailing firmh defence

Folk theorem

Free ride

Game Theory

              Non-cooperative Game Theory

              Static Game

              Dynamic game

                             Sequential moves

                                           Game tree, extensive form

                             Backward induction – subgame perfect

                             Repeated game

                                           Trigger strategy – tacit collusion

                                           Tit-for-tat strategy

                                           Folk theorem

                             Imperfect information

Incomplete information

               Nature, Harsanyi

Gate-keeper effects

Hierarchy of needs

physiological needs, safety needs, a need for belonging and love, self-esteem: the desire for achievement and the desire for reputation and prestige, self-actualisation (highest in the order)c it is a starting point for understanding how people behave, particularly in groups.

              by Abragam Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1954

              memo. for refinement of game theory

HHI

              Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

Hold-up

Hypothetical Monopolist Test

              ¨SSNIP test

Incentive

              Conflicting objectives and decentralized information are thus the two basic ingredients of incentive theory

              Incentive theory considers when this private information is a problem for the principal, and what is the optimal way for the principal to cope with it

              The Theory of Incentives - the Principal-Agent Model -, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, Princeton University Press, 2002

Information Good

              Experience good

              Returns to scale

              Public goods

              Markets for Information Goods by Hal R. Varian, University of California, Berkeley, 1998

Innovation

              Innovation is King

              Competition Policy in the Information Economy, by Carl Shapiro, on his web page, 1999

Intra-brand Competition / Inter-brand Competition

Joint Venture / JV

Leverage

              - Monopoly leveraging

Most U.S courts have held that it is not unlawful for a firm with a monopoly in one market to use its monopoly power in that market to gain a competitive advantage in neighboring markets, unless by so doing it serves either to maintain its existing monopoly or to create a dangerous probability of gaining a monopoly in the adjacent market as well [US]

(B)y contrast, it is an abuse of dominance for a firm that is dominant in one market to use that position to gain a competitive advantage in a neighboring market in which it is not even if the conduct is not shown to be likely to create a dominant position in the second market unless the dominant firm can show a legitimate business justification for its conduct.[EC – Tetra Pak II (1996), recent eCommission issues market power assessment Guidelines for electronic communicationsf]

              North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging Toward What?, by William J. Kolasky, BIICL conference, 2002

Principal-agent theory

Market Definition

              [Economic Markets and Relevant Markets: Kaserman and Zeisel (1996) pp.668]

              Economic Markets – Where one is interested in modeling market equilibrium, an economic market concept is required.

              Antitrust (relevant) Markets - Where one is concerned with the potential exercise of market power, an antitrust market concept may be appropriate.

              European Commission Notice on Market Definition

                             A relevant product market / A relevant geographic market (other product characteristics, such as time)

              Case law in ECJ (CFI)

"For the purpose of Article 86, the proper definition of the relevant market is a necessary precondition for any judgment as to allegedly anti-competitive behaviour, since, before an abuse of a dominant position is ascertained, it is necessary to establish the existence of a dominant position in a given market, which presupposes that such a market has already been defined. On the other hand, for the purpose of applying Article 85, the reason for defining the relevant market, if at all, is to determine whether the agreement, the decision e by an association of undertakings or the concerted practice at issue is liable to affect trade between Member States and has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market."(Volkswagen AG case, Case T-62/98, Volkswagen AG v Commission of the European Communities, [2000] ECR II-2707, para. 230)

Market Power

              the power to fix prices or exclude competitioncin economics

Maverick

              A firm with ga greater economic incentive to deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of rivals

              1992 Merger Guidelines

              a firm that declines to follow the industry consensus and thereby constraints effective coordination

              Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, by William J. Kolasky, ABA Meeting, 2002

eThe maverick indeed could be an observably disruptive force, taking the lead in starting price wars or sales, but it also could keep price from rising merely by refusing to follow rival attempts to raise pricef

              Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws, New York University Law Review, vol.77, 2002

              A vigorous and effective competitor

              Trade Practice Act, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)

Merger

              Horizontal Merger

              Vertical Merger

Nash Equilibrium

Natural Monopoly

                             Activity that is most cost-effectively carried out by a single company rather than by several

                             Competition in Telecommunications, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 2000

Network Externality

                             Arises when users of a service benefit when more people use the service

                             Competition in Telecommunications, by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 2000

Predatory Pricing

Price Discrimination

Price discrimination is a very common business practice. Economic theory also shows that, in many circumstances, it can actually enhance economic welfare and efficiency.

              Competing Ideas, OXERA, July 2002

              If total output is higher than under uniform pricing, such price discrimination is welfare enhancing.

              Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination, by Schmalensee, R., American Economic Review, 71, 1981

              First-degree price discrimination

perfect price discrimination

              Second-degree price discrimination

                             nonlinear pricing, ex. bulk sales, quantity discounts

              Third-degree price discrimination

                             multimarket price discrimination, ex. Student discounts, regional variation in pricing

Product Differentiation

Public Good

Ramsey pricing

              Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing, inversely proportional to the elasticities of demands for the services

              But incomplete information;

Rent-seeking

Significant Market Power (SMP)

Specific subject matter

              ¨see yLegal Concepts in EC/EU Lawz(free movements, competition law)

SSNIP test

              Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price

This test considers whether, starting from the competitive price, it would be profitable over a period of about one year for an entity or entities to implement a hypothetical small (in the range of 5 to 10%) increase in price. This will depend upon the degree of consumer switching to other products (demand substitution) and additional supply (supply substitution). If such a price increase is not profitable, the products to which consumers would switch, or additional output, are included within the relevant product or geographic market

Market Definitions for Regulatory Obligations in Communications Markets, A Study for the European Commission, May 2002

Substantial Lessening of Competition (SLC) test

State Aid

Structural Separation

Substitutability

Switching cost

Transaction costs, Compatibility costs, Learning costs, Contractual costs, Uncertainty costs (experience goods), Psychological costs, Shopping costs, Search costs

Switching costs, Economic Discussion Paper 5, Part one: Economic models and policy implications, A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading and the Department of Trade and Industry by NERA, April 2003

Synergies

              WOULD the Merging Firms Likely Achieve the Efficiencies Unilaterally?

              NO: Efficiencies are Merger-Specific

                                           «

COULD the Efficiencies Be Achieved Unilaterally?

              YES: Efficiencies ARE NOT Synergies

              NO: Efficiencies ARE Synergies

              Scale Economics and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis, Antitrust Law Journal, vol.68, 2001

              by Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

The Market for Lemons

              Adverse selection

              Asymmetric information

Two-part tariff

              gDisneyland Dilemmah

Tying

Unilateral Effects

X-inefficiency

 

yLegal Concepts in EC/EU Lawz

Proportionality

              (1) Whether the measure was suitable to achieve the desired end;

              (2) Whether it was necessary to achieve the desired end;

              (3) Whether the measure imposed a burden on the individual that was excessive in relation to the objective sought to be achieved (proportionality stricto sensu)

              --- Craig & De Buca pp.372

Specific subject matter

The ECJ developed this idea of each kind of intellectual property right, the protection of which is justified even if it leads to restrictions on inter-Member State trade: the exercise of intellectual property rights which partitions the market will be allowed in so far as it is necessary to protect especific subject matterf

--- ethe existence/exercise dichotomy is simply a flexible too developed by the ECJf, Jones and Sufrin pp.562

cf. Article 295 EC (Member States govern the system of property ownership), Case 56 and 58/64 Consten & Grundig, Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon

Subsidiarity

 

yCompeting Ideas-from OXERA free servicez

ƒoƒbƒNƒiƒ“ƒo[‚ªƒAƒbƒv‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚Ü‚·B

2004-06 Ryanair and the MEIP

                                           (OXERA advised Ryanair during this investigation)

2004-05 Competition Versus Intellectual Property Rights

                                           Concerning IMS Health v NDC Health judgment

2003-10 Quantifying Damages

                                           The example of a price-fixing cartel

                                           Counterfactual analysis

                                           Abuse of dominant cases

                                           Conclusion

2003-09 Informational Asymmetries – Whatfs your number?

                                           Products with limited information

                                           Limited information can lead to lower quality

                                           Poor information can lead to higher prices

                                           Prices after liberalisation

                                           Concluding remarks

2003-08 The Market for Airport Slots

                                           The current EU System

                                           Defects with the current system

                                           Possible changes to the system

                                           Impact on competition

                                           Conclusion

2003-07 Assessing Profitability in Competition Analysis [based on OFTfs Economic Discussion Paper (2003) 2003-07]

                             Relevance of profitability assessment in competition policy

                                           - Assessing market power or degree of competitiveness in a market

                                           - Market definition

                                           - Assessment of entry barriers

                                           - Excessive pricing

                                           - Margin squeeze

                                           - Predation and cross-subsidy

                                           - Coordinated effects in merger cases

                                           - Failing-firm defence in merger cases

                                           - State Aid

                                           - Quantification of damages and determination of fines

                             Contents:

                                           The IRR (internal rate of return) versus ROCE (return on capital employed)

                                           Applying the IRR

                                           Estimating asset values

                                           Use of other proxy measures

                                           Benchmarking profitability

                                           Interpretation of the results

                                           Conclusion

2003-06 Principles underlying ex ante regulation

                                           Risks inherent in ex ante regulation

                                           Guiding principles

                                                         Do the minimum necessary

                                                         Take actions to promote competition wherever possible

                                                         Ensure that any actions taken are properly targeted

                                                         Be aware of the potential conflicts between network- and service-based competition

                                                         Be aware that some remedies may not be suitable when concerns relate to joint dominance

                                           Conclusion

2003-05 Cost Allocation in Competition Policy

                                           Direct and indirect costs

                                           Methods of cost allocation

                                           Demand-based allocation

                                           Cost floors and ceilings

                                           Conclusion

2003-04 Competition in Cleaning and Settlement

                                           A system of national monopolies

                                           Natural monopoly or competition?

                                           Consolidation between CSDs(Settlement and custody by central securities depositories) and CCPs(Clearing by central counterparties)

                                           Conclusion

2003-03 Standardisation

                                           Incentives to standardize

                                           Private incentives to standardize

                                           Social incentives to standardize

                                           The standard-setting process

                                           Conclusions

2003-02 The Use of Economics in State-Aid Investigations

                                           What is aid?

                                           Market economy investor principle (MEIP)

                                           MEIP applied to publicly owned companies

                                           What aid is permitted?

                                           Economic Justifications

                                           Conclusion

2003-01 Margin Squeeze and Deep Discounting in the UK Pay-TV Market – Could the OFT have made a case?

[based on 2002-12 OFTfs decision]

               Background to the case

                                           The OFTfs Competition Act investigation

                                           Margin squeeze

                                           Conclusion

2002-12 Exploitative Abuses of Dominance

                                           Exploitative versus exclusionary

                                           Short run versus long run

                                           Practical problems

                                           Napp: a prelude to more excessive pricing cases?

                                           Other types of exploitative abuse

                                           Conclusion

2002-11 The Critical Sales Loss Test in Market Definition

                                           The SNNIP test for market definition

                                           Critical sales loss

                                           A practical application: holiday parks

                                           Conclusion

2002-10 Efficiency Defence in Mergers

                                           Efficiency defence in merger control

                                           What does economic theory tell us?

                                           Can economies of scale esavef a merger?

                                           Efficiency defence in practice

                                           A policy change?

2002-09 The Benefits of Competition Policy [based on OFTfs Economic Discussion Paper 4 (2002) 2002-06]

                                           Benefits of competition

                                           Utility markets in the UK

                                           Collusion and price-fixing cartels

                                           Mergers and market concentration

                                           The duplicate microfilm market in the USA

                                           Office equipment superstores in the USA

                                           Carbonated soft drinks in the USA

                                           Conclusion

2002-08 Leverage of Market Power

                                           Leveraging in the market for broadband Internet access

                                           Economic theories of leverage

                                           Oftelfs investigation into BTfs unmetered off-peak Internet packages

                                           Conclusion

2002-07 Discriminatory Pricing

                                           Price discrimination in theory

                                           Assessment under competition law

                                           Examples of discrimination cases

                                           Conclusion

2002-06 Collective Dominance From An Economic Perspective

                                           What is collective dominance? – pre-Airtours

                                           The economic theory of oligopoly

                                           Dynamic oligopoly theory, or the theory of tacit collusion

                                           What is collective dominance? – post-Airtours

                                           Conclusions

2002-05 Profitability in Competition Investigations

                                           Return on capital employed

                                           Internal rate of return

                                           Return on Turnover/Sales

                                           Conclusion

2002-04 Competition in the Banking Sector

                                           Financial services to SMEs

                                           High switching costs

                                           Market power?

                                           Anti-competitive practices

                                           Remedies

                                           Conclusion

2002-03 Parallel Imports: European Policy Inconsistency?

                                           The concept of exhaustion

                                           The Silhouette case

                                           Economic aspect of parallel trade

                                           Parallel trade and competition law

                                           Conclusion: European policy inconsistency?

2002-02 Competition and Network Externalities                  

                                           The economics of network externalities

                                           The problem of tipping

                                           The problem of pricing

                                           Conclusion

 

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The Tension Between Competition Policy and State Intervention: the EU and US Compared*

                                           European State Aid Law Quarterly 4/2004 (Oktober 2004)

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The Tension Between Competition Policy and State Intervention: the EU and US Compared

                              University of Leicester, Faculty of Law, Graduate Studies, Dissertation (LL.M. with distinction) (July 2005)

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Focusing on the Presence of a Public Service Broadcaster and Entry Barriers by a Licensing System in the Broadcasting Market*

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                              Journal of Political Science and Sociology@No.18 (March 2013)

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@@@@@Evaluating the Product Portfolio for NHK, the Japanese Public Service Broadcaster: A Propensity Score Matching Approach*

                                           International Journal of Media Management (Published online: 21 Jun 2016)

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@@@@@@uw‘‹«‚È‚«ƒeƒŒƒrŽw—߁x‚̉ü³‚ɂ‚¢‚ā|‰p‘‚É‚¨‚¯‚鍑“à–@‰»‚Ì‹c˜_‚𒆐S‚Ɂ|v

                                           ŒcœäƒWƒƒƒ“Eƒ‚ƒlEUŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[EEU–@ƒZƒ~ƒi[i2008”N12ŒŽ20“új

@@@@@@u“ú–{‚É‚¨‚¯‚郁ƒfƒBƒAW’†FW’†“xŒv‘ª‚Ì’†ŠÔ•ñ‚È‚ç‚Ñ‚É‚»‚Ì–â‘è“_v

                                           î•ñ’ʐMŠw‰ïE‘æ26‰ñŠw‰ï‘å‰ïi•½¬21”N6ŒŽ27“úi“yjE6ŒŽ28“úi“újj ‘å‰ïƒvƒƒOƒ‰ƒ€

@@@@@@Measuring Efficiency of Japanese Regulated Industries by DEA: Cases of Telecommunications and Broadcasting [co-authored]

                                           OR51 Annual Conference, University of Warwick, 8th to 10th September 2009 ‘å‰ïƒvƒƒOƒ‰ƒ€ ”­•\ƒvƒŒƒ[ƒ“

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                                           Œö‰vŽ–‹ÆŠw‰ïEŠÖ“Œ•”‰ïi•½¬22”N3ŒŽ6“új

ITS@18th Biennial and Silver Anniversary Conference Session: Media Concentration Around the World: Asian Group (June 29: 14:00-15:30)

                                           ƒJƒ“ƒtƒ@ƒŒƒ“ƒXƒz[ƒ€ƒy[ƒW

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                                           “ú–{ŽÐ‰ïS—Šw‰ï‘å‰ïi2011”N9ŒŽ18-19“új

TeliaSoneraŽ–Œi‰¢•ÄŽ–—áj

                                           ŒoÏ–@Œ¤‹†‰ïi‘æ20‰ñE2011”N10ŒŽ13“új

                                           “Œ‹ž‘åŠwƒOƒ[ƒoƒ‹COEƒvƒƒOƒ‰ƒ€\‘‰Æ‚ÆŽsê‚Ì‘ŠŒÝŠÖŒW‚É‚¨‚¯‚éƒ\ƒtƒgƒ[

Media Pluralism and the Great East Japan Earthquake - from the perspectives of public service broadcasting

                                           Media Concentration around the World: Analyses towards Conclusions (January 19-21, 2012)

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                                           ƒlƒbƒgƒ[ƒN‚ª‘n”­‚·‚é’m”\Œ¤‹†‰ïiJEWIN12jEŠé‰æƒZƒbƒVƒ‡ƒ“i2012”N8ŒŽ30“új

@@@@@ ‹¤“¯Œ¤‹†uEU‘‰Æ•â•‹K§‚̍l‚¦•û‚̉䂪‘‚ւ̉ž—p‚ɂ‚¢‚āv

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                                           ICTƒT[ƒrƒXˆÀSEˆÀ‘SŒ¤‹†‰ïƒTƒCƒg

@@@@@@LutonŽ–ŒŽ–Œi‰¢•ÄŽ–—áj

                                         ŒoÏ–@Œ¤‹†‰ïiŠO‘‹£‘ˆ–@Ž–—ጤ‹†‰ïj i‘æ32‰ñE2014”N9ŒŽ25“ú Arriva the Shires Ltd v London Luton Airport Operations Ltdj

@@@@@@Evaluating the product portfolio of Japanese public service broadcaster: Consumer vs. citizen's view [co-authored]@

                                           ITS Biennial Conference, 30 November 2014

@@@@@@uƒvƒ‰ƒCƒoƒV[EƒrƒbƒOƒf[ƒ^E‹£‘ˆ–@|Facebook/WhatsApp‡•¹E‰¢BˆÏˆõ‰ïŒˆ’èv@

                                           ŒcœäƒWƒƒƒ“Eƒ‚ƒlEUŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[EEU–@ƒZƒ~ƒi[i2015”N4ŒŽ25“új

@@@@@@ulH’m”\iAIjŽž‘ã‚Ì‹£‘ˆ–@vŽŽ˜_—gƒAƒ‹ƒSƒŠƒYƒ€h‚É‚æ‚éƒJƒ‹ƒeƒ‹F‰¢•Ä‚̍ŐVŽ–—á‚𓥂܂¦‚Ä—

                                           ŒcœäƒWƒƒƒ“Eƒ‚ƒlEUŒ¤‹†ƒZƒ“ƒ^[EEU–@ƒZƒ~ƒi[i2016”N11ŒŽ12“új

 

yOfficial Working Papersz

Media Economics

On Measuring the Value of Public Broadcasting by CVM; A SurveyiCVM‚É‚æ‚é•ú‘—‚̉¿’l‚Ì‘ª’èj[E][J] iwith Dr. Tsujij

                                           Graduate School of Applied Informatics, University of Hyogo, Discussion Paper No.2, 2007 [Discussion Paper No.1 [AIDP0901], February, 2009]

                                           ¥ŠÂ‹«­ô“™‚Å—p‚¢‚ç‚ê‚éCVM‚́AŒö‹¤•ú‘—‚̉¿’l‘ª’è‚ÉŽg‚í‚ê‚邱‚Æ‚à‘½‚¢B‘“àŠO‚ÌŽ–—áA¡“ú“IˆÓ‹`‚ð‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚½ƒT[ƒxƒC˜_•¶B

Measuring the Value of Japanese Public Broadcasting in the Age of Convergence iwith Dr. Tsuji, Dr. Miyaharaj

                                           Graduate School of Applied Informatics, University of Hyogo, Discussion Paper No.2 [AIDP0902], February, 2009

                                           ¥ã‹LuCVM‚É‚æ‚é•ú‘—‚̉¿’l‚Ì‘ª’èv‚Ì‘±•ÒBŽÀÛ‚ÉCVM‚ðŽÀŽ{‚µ‚½ƒP[ƒX‚ð‚Ü‚Æ‚ß‚½‚à‚́BkRelated Materialsl

Competition Law

Competition Law and Public Policy Justification: the EU and Japan compared

                              CLaSF Working Paper Series, No.09, 2009

                              ¥‹£‘ˆ–@‚ªŒö‹¤­ô‚É‚æ‚鐳“–‰»——R‚ɂǂ̂悤‚ɑΏˆ‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚é‚©‚́A‚»‚̍‘‚Ì‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì“Á’¥‚ªo‚é‹Ç–ʂ̂ЂƂ‚ł ‚éB“ú/EU‚ð”äŠr‚µA‚»‚Ì‹c˜_‚ð[‚ß‚éB

 

yŒ¤‹†‰ïz

 yI—¹z

ƒƒfƒBƒAW’†‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚錤‹†‰ïiî•ñ’ʐMŠw‰ïjyI—¹z

u‹£‘ˆ–@‚ÌŠÏ“_‚©‚猩‚½‘‰Æ•â•‹K§]EU‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì‹c˜_‚ðŽQl‚ɁviCPRCjyI—¹z

uEU‘‰Æ•â•‹K§‚̍l‚¦•û‚̉䂪‘‚Ö‚Ì“–‚Ă͂߂ɂ‚¢‚āviCPRCjyI—¹z

ŠO‘‹£‘ˆ–@Ž–—ጤ‹†‰ïiIBCj@ƒA[ƒJƒCƒuiŒoÏ–@Œ¤‹†‰ïjyŒp‘±’†z

 

yWorking Papersc‚ƌĂׂé“ú‚Í‚¢‚‚©Hz

¦ƒn[ƒhƒfƒBƒXƒN—e—ʂ̃Aƒbƒv‚ªŠ®—¹‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½Bƒ_ƒEƒ“ƒ[ƒh‰Â”\‚É‚È‚Á‚Ä‚¨‚è‚Ü‚·B

ˆø—p‚Å‚«‚é‚悤‚È“à—e‚Å‚Í‚ ‚è‚Ü‚¹‚ñ‚ªAŽQl‚É‚³‚ê‚éê‡‚Í‚²˜A—‚­‚¾‚³‚¢B

‚Ü‚½Aƒ}ƒbƒLƒ“ƒgƒbƒVƒ…‚̈ꕔƒuƒ‰ƒEƒU[‚ł́A}•\‚ª‚¤‚Ü‚­•\Ž¦‚³‚ê‚È‚¢ê‡‚ª‚ ‚é‚悤‚Å‚·B‚²—¹³‚­‚¾‚³‚¢iƒ}ƒbƒNƒ†[ƒU[‚Ȃ̂ɁcjB

Please do not quote from my papers without notification. Distorted charts might be shown sometimes because of the nature of the browser.

 

Working Paper/Memorandum

No. 02-01 Leverage of Market Power in eNew Economyf (.pdf-file) [last updated 2002-08-27]

No. 02-02 ‹£‘ˆ–@‚Æ•\Œ»‚ÌŽ©—R‚̐ړ_‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚郁ƒ‚\‚kƒ‚[ƒhEƒRƒ“ƒeƒ“ƒc—Ï—Šî€‚ð‚ß‚®‚éˆÓŒ©•åWŒ‹‰Ê‚©‚ç\ (.pdf-file) [2001-08, last updated at 2002-07-25]

No. 02-03 Memorandum on Carnival case – Case note No.02-001 (.pdf-file) [2002-07-26] [Before FTC decision and re-investigation by the European Commission]

No. 02-04 Memorandum on E.ON case – Case note No.02-002 (.pdf-file) [2002-10-03]

No. 02-05 CFIAEBU‚̃Xƒ|[ƒc•ú‘—Œ Žæ“¾ƒ‹[ƒ‹‚É–³Œø”»Œˆ (.pdf-file) [2002-10-09]

No. 02-06 EC Merger Regulation Review‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚郁ƒ‚ i.doc-filej [2002-11-25]

No. 02-07 EC Antitrust Reform‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚郁ƒ‚i.doc-filej [2002-11-27]

No. 02-08 EC‹£‘ˆ–@86ð2€i‘‰Æ•â•ƒ‹[ƒ‹j‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éˆêŽ–—á |BBCA24ŽžŠÔƒjƒ…[ƒXŠJŽn‚ð‚ß‚®‚Á‚ā|(.pdf-file) [2002-06-12, up at 2002-12-04]

No. 02-09 Remedies in National Courts – EC Competition Law@Courage Case C-453/99 and Eco Swiss China Time Case C-126/97 [2002-12-06]

No. 02-10 “Ɛè•ú‘—Œ ‚ÆEC‹£‘ˆ–@–ARD Network‚̃P[ƒX‚©‚ç [2002-12-16]

 

No. 03-01 eLacunaf of original EC Competition Law, from the perspective of eJudicial Activismf and Legal Reasoning (.doc-file) [2003-01-08, final update 02-12]

No. 03-02 Memorandum on Newscorp/Telepiu case (.doc-file) [2003-04-03]

No. 03-03 ƒJ[ƒ‹ƒgƒ“EƒRƒ~ƒ…ƒjƒP[ƒVƒ‡ƒ“ƒY‚ƃOƒ‰ƒiƒ_‚̍‡•¹‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é‰pŒö³Žæˆø’¡OFTˆÓŒ©‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä (.doc-file) [2003-04-04]

No. 03-02,03 ‰¢B‚É‚¨‚¯‚郁ƒfƒBƒA‡•¹ƒP[ƒX‚ÌŠ¨Š|Carlton/Granada, Newscorp/Telepiu‚ð—á‚Ɂ| (.pdf-file) [2003-04-22]

No. 03-04 Implications of the Vizzavi case – remedy in the context of edynamicf market (.doc-file) [2003-05-13]

No. 03-05 Development of eMutual Recognitionf in EC Law and its effect on broadcasting (.doc-file) [2003-05-22]

No. 03-06 Free Movement of Services and Article 86(2) EC - Corsica Ferries France case (.doc-file) [2003-07-07]

No. 03-07 Essential Facilities Doctrine in the EC Law – Application for Intellectual Property Rights - (.pdf-file) [2003-10-09]

 

No. 04-01 Discussion Paper - Harmonization of Company Law (.pdf-file) [2004-02-10]

No. 04-02 The Tension Between Competition Policy and State Intervention: the EU and US Compared [2004-09-15] (Dissertation; submitted)

No. 04-03 ECJAEBU‚̃Xƒ|[ƒc•ú‘—Œ Žæ“¾ƒ‹[ƒ‹‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éCFI”»Œˆ‚ðŽxŽ (No.02-05ŠÖ˜A) (.pdf-file) [2004-10-19]

 

No. 05-01-1 ‰p‘‹£‘ˆ“–‹Ç‚©‚猩‚½EC‘‰Æ•â•ƒXƒL[ƒ€‚Ì“W–]|‰pŒö³Žæˆø’¡iOFTjƒŠƒ|[ƒgwŒö“I•â•x‚©‚ç|[2005-03-07] isubmittedj

No. 05-01-2 EC‹£‘ˆ–@E‘‰Æ•â•ƒ‹[ƒ‹‚Ì”»’fŠî€|EC/‰p‘‹£‘ˆ–@‚ÌŒð³EEC/EU–@‚́gŒ›–@‰»h‚Ì•¶–¬‚©‚ç|[2005-04-18]

No. 05-02 ‘½—l‚ȉ¿’l‚ð’Ç‹‚·‚éŒöŠé‹Æ‚Æ“Ž¡E‹K§|‰p‘Œö‹¤•ú‘—BBC‚ð‚ß‚®‚é‹c˜_‚ð‘èÞ‚Ɂ|[2005-12-06]

No. 05-03 ƒtƒ‰ƒ“ƒXŠé‹ÆAlstom‹~Ï|‘‰Æ•â•‚ð‚ß‚®‚éECˆÏˆõ‰ï‚ƉÁ–¿‘‚̑Λ³|

 

No. 06-01 u‘‹«‚È‚«ƒeƒŒƒrv‚©‚çu‘‹«‚È‚«‰f‘œƒƒfƒBƒAƒT[ƒrƒXv‚Ö°|EC‚É‚¨‚¯‚鎋’®Šo­ô‚̕ω»‚Ì‘Ù“®|[2006-12-14 tentative version]

No. 06-02 •ú‘—ƒT[ƒrƒX‚̉¿’l‘ª’èi•¶Œ£ƒT[ƒxƒCj(completed, anonymous)

No. 06-03 ‘“àÙ”»Š‚ÆEC‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì“ˆê“K—p‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éˆêlŽ@\‰p‘‚ÌŽ–—á‚ðŽQl‚É /Memorandum

No. 06-04 sˆ×‘[’u‚Ìremedy•]‰¿|Carlton/Granada CRRƒŒƒrƒ…[ /Memorandum

No. 06-05 Postal service and Competition policy: EU and Japan compared – Yamato Transport Co. v. Japan Post /Memorandum

No. 06-06 ƒtƒ@ƒCƒXƒi[Eƒƒ‚‚ÆŒö‹¤ƒT[ƒrƒXÓ”C /Memorandum

No. 06-07 ”»—á•]ŽßFCapital/GWR radio /Memorandum

No. 06-08 Žsê‚ւ̉e‹¿•ªÍ‚̂ЂƂ‚̎Ž‚݁|‰p‘ƒeƒŒƒrLŽsê‚ð‚ß‚®‚錤‹†‚©‚ç| /Memorandum

 

No. 07-01 ‘“àÙ”»Š‚ÆEC‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì“ˆê“K—p‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éˆêlŽ@\‰p‘‚ÌŽ–—á‚ðŽQl‚É /Memorandum – No.07-04‚É“‡

No. 07-02 u‘‹«‚È‚«ƒeƒŒƒrv‚©‚çu‘‹«‚È‚«‰f‘œƒƒfƒBƒAƒT[ƒrƒXv‚Ö°|EC‚É‚¨‚¯‚鎋’®Šo­ô‚̕ω»‚Ì‘Ù“®| [Œp‘±]

No. 07-03 •ú‘—ƒT[ƒrƒX‚̉¿’l‘ª’è [2007-03 tentative version]

No. 07-04 ‘‰Æ•â•­ô‚̍ŐV“®Œü [2007-05-07 tentative version; to be continued]

No. 07-04 EC‹£‘ˆ–@‚É‚¨‚¯‚é‚¢‚í‚ä‚鐂’¼“I§ŒÀ‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éÅV“®Œü [2007-05-07 tentative version; to be continued]

No. 07-04 EC‹£‘ˆ–@‚̃Gƒ“ƒtƒH[ƒXƒƒ“ƒg‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éÅV“®Œü [2007-05-07 tentative version; to be continued]

No. 07-05 BBC‚É‚¨‚¯‚éPublic Value Test‚ÆEU‘‰Æ•â•­ô

No. 07-06 2007”N‰¢B—Ž–‰ï‚É‚¨‚¯‚éIGC Draft|‹£‘ˆ–@ŠÖ˜A‹K’è‚ւ̉e‹¿|(.pdf-file) [Legal CheckŒã’Ç•â”Å]

No. 07-07 •ú‘—§“x‚Æ‹£‘ˆ­ô

No. 07-08 Social Market Economy‚ÆReform Treaty

No. 07-09 Social Market Economy‚ÆAmartya Sen

No. 07-10 Œo‰c‚ƕҏW\Thomson/Reuters, News/DJ, ŠÖ¼ƒeƒŒƒr‚ÌŽ–—á‚©‚ç

 

No. 08-01 ŠÂ‹«­ô‚ÆEU‹£‘ˆ–@‡TF”roŒ Žæˆø‚ƍ‘‰Æ•â•

No. 08-02 ŠÂ‹«­ô‚ÆEU‹£‘ˆ–@‡UFŠÂ‹«•ÛŒì‚Æ81ðA82ð

No. 08-03 Noam Index‚Æ“ú–{

No. 08-04 Competition Law and Public Policy Justification: the EU and Japan compared

No. 08-05 ‰¢B‚É‚¨‚¯‚é’ʐME•ú‘——Z‡Žž‘ã‚Ö‚ÌŽæ‚è‘g‚݁|Ž‹’®ŠoƒƒfƒBƒAƒT[ƒrƒXŽw—߉º‚̃Gƒ“ƒtƒH[ƒXƒƒ“ƒg‚ɂ‚¢‚ā|  

 

No. 09-01 ŠÂ‹«­ô‚ÆEU‹£‘ˆ–@|“ú–{Šé‹Æ‚ÌŽ‹“_‚©‚ç

No. 09-02 ‹à—ZŠë‹@‚ÆEU‹£‘ˆ–@|‘‰Æ•â•‹K’è‚𒆐S‚É

No. 09-03 UKVOD gProject Kangarooh|‰pE‹£‘ˆˆÏˆõ‰ï‚É‚æ‚éJV•s”F‰Â‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä

No. 09-04 ‚¢‚í‚ä‚é“Æ—§‹K§‹@ŠÖ‚̍‘Û”äŠriFCC‚ÆOfcomj

No. 09-05 “ú–{‚Ì–¯ŠÔ•ú‘—‹Ç‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éDEA•ªÍ‚ÌŽŽs

 

No.10-01 EU‹£‘ˆ–@‚Ì‹K”Í“IlŽ@|EU‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŽx”z“I’nˆÊ‚Ì—”—p‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é‹c˜_‚ð‚ß‚®‚Á‚Ä[JP][EN]

No.10-02-1 ƒƒfƒBƒA‚Ì‘½Œ³«‚Æ‹£‘ˆ–@|‰¢B‚ÌŽ–—á‚©‚çireportedj

No.10-02-2 ƒƒfƒBƒA‚Ì‘½Œ³«‚ð•Ûá‚·‚é‹£‘ˆ–@‚ÌŽË’ö‚ÌŒŸ“¢|EUE‰p‘‚̏󋵂𒆐S‚Ɂ|[JP] (submitted) [EN]

No.10-03 Œö‹¤•ú‘—‚̉¿’l•]‰¿[EN]

No.10-04 Œö‹¤•ú‘—‚ÌŒø—¦«•]‰¿‚ɂ‚¢‚ā`‰p‘BBC‚ÌŽ–—á[EN]

No.10-05 ‰p‘‚É‚¨‚¯‚郁ƒfƒBƒAŠÖŒW”»—á‚̏ó‹µ

No.10-06 ‹£‘ˆ–@‚ÆŽ–‹Æ–@‚Ì‹·ŠÔ‚Ł|‰p‰q¯•ú‘—Ž–‹ÆŽÒBSkyB‚̃vƒŒƒ~ƒAƒ€ƒRƒ“ƒeƒ“ƒc‚É‚æ‚鑼ŽÒ”rœŽ–—á|

No.10-07 Reynolds Defence‚̍¡Œã‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä

No.10-08 “ú‰p•ÄŽå—v•ú‘—Ž–‹ÆŽÒ‚ÌŒo‰cŒø—¦«‚̐„ˆÚ‚Æ‚»‚Ì—vˆö

 

No.11-01 Competition Policy and Media Industry in Japan - From the Perspective of Economic Freedom in the Digital Age

No.11-02 Assessment of the function of Public Service Broadcasting in Europe - From the perspectives of social capital –

 

No.12-01 Media Pluralism and the Great East Japan Earthquake – from the perspectives of the functions of the public service broadcasting

No.12-02 Media Policy and Competition Law - Rights-based competition law approach

No.12-03 State Aid‹K§‚̐öÝ—́\EU–@‚Ìçb‚ð’´‚¦‚Ä

 

No.13-01 u‹£‘ˆ–@‚́w•\Œ»‚ÌŽ©—Rx‚Ì”j‰óŽÒ‚©•ÛŒìŽÒ‚©|î•ñŽÐ‰ï‚̐V‚µ‚¢’˜‚ÌŒ`¬Šú‚É‚¨‚¯‚éˆêŽŽ˜_F‰¢•Ä‚ÌŽ–—á‚©‚ç|v

No.13-02 u­Ž¡“I‰ß’ö‚É‚¨‚¯‚éƒIƒ“ƒ‰ƒCƒ“ƒjƒ…[ƒX‚ÌŒø‰Êv

 

No.14-01 Evaluating the Product Portfolio of the Japanese Public Service Broadcaster: Consumerfs View vs. Citizenfs View

 

No.17-01 ŒÂlƒf[ƒ^‚̓Cƒ“ƒ^[ƒlƒbƒgŽž‘ã‚́u’ʉ݁v‚©H

No.17-02 ƒrƒbƒOƒf[ƒ^Žž‘ã‚Ì‹£‘ˆ–@

No.17-03 ŒÂlƒf[ƒ^•ÛŒì‚Æ‹£‘ˆ–@

No.17-04 ŒÂlƒf[ƒ^‚ƃWƒƒ[ƒiƒŠƒYƒ€

 

IDEAS

¥ƒCƒ^ƒŠƒA‘“à‚É‚¨‚¯‚é‹âs‡•¹‹K§‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚éAEC‡•¹‹K‘¥i“K—pœŠO‹K’èi21ð4€j‚ÌŒŸ“¢jAŽ‘–{‚ÌŽ©—RˆÚ“®A—¼–Ê‚©‚ç‚ÌŒŸ“¢

i–{•ÒƒTƒCƒg¥2005-12-14j

¥BAA”ƒŽû‚ð‚ß‚®‚éECˆÏˆõ‰ïAOFT‚Ì”»’f‚ɂ‚¢‚Ä

i–{•ÒƒTƒCƒg¥2006-05-25j

 

Communications Regulation Reform in the UK and EU from the perspective of competition policy

Competition in Broadcasting Industry --- EchoStar/DirecTV, NewsCorp/DirecTV cases from the DOJ/FCC's perspectives

Competition and Pluralism – Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere case –

From Chicago to Brussels – coordinated effect, unilateral effect

gŽsêŽx”z—́h•ªÍ‚ɂ‚¢‚āF“ú•Ä‰¢”äŠr‚©‚ç

»•i·•Ê‰»Žsê‚É‚¨‚¯‚éŽsê‰æ’è/ŽsêŽx”z—Í•ªÍ‚ɂ‚¢‚Ẵqƒ“ƒg*

 

yPreparatory Papersz - WHAT DO YOU THINK THIS IDEA?

Preparatory Paper No. 02-01 Game Theoretical Approach toward Regional Integration

– from the perspective of European Union, relationship between European Court of Justice and National Court – [2002-09-18]